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Abstract of Thesis

SINGLE EVENT UPSET DETECTION IN FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE
ARRAYS

The high-radiation environment in space can lead to anomalies in normal satellite
operation. A major cause of concern to spacecraft-designers is the single event upset
(SEU). SEUs can result in deviations from expected component behavior and are capable
of causing irreversible damage to hardware. In particular, Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs) are known to be highly susceptible to SEUs. Radiation-hardened
versions of such devices are associated with an increase in power consumption and cost
in addition to being technologically inferior when compared to contemporary
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts. This thesis consequently aims at exploring the
option of using COTS FPGAs in satellite payloads. A framework is developed, allowing
the SEU susceptibility of such a device to be studied. SEU testing is carried out in a
software-simulated fault environment using a set of Java classes called JBits. A radiation
detector module, to measure the radiation backdrop of the device, is also envisioned as
part of the final design implementation.
KEYWORDS: Radiation, Geiger tube, Scintillator, Semiconductor Detector, Single
Event Upset (SEU), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), JTAG, JBits, XHWIF

Shadab Gopinath Ambat
02/29/2008

SINGLE EVENT UPSET DETECTION IN FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE
ARRAYS

By
Shadab Gopinath Ambat

Dr. James E. Lumpp Jr.
Director of Thesis
Dr. Yu Ming Zhang
Director Graduate Studies

02/29/2008

RULES FOR THE USE OF THESIS

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master’s degree and deposited in the University of
Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are to be used only with due
regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but
quotations or summaries of parts may be published only with the usual scholarly
acknowledgements.
Extensive copying or publication of the dissertation in whole or in part also requires the
consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky.
A library that borrows this project for use by its patrons is expected to secure the
signature of each user.

Name

Date

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

THESIS

Shadab Gopinath Ambat

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2008

SINGLE EVENT UPSET DETECTION IN FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE
ARRAYS

THESIS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Science in the College of Engineering
at the University of Kentucky
By
Shadab Gopinath Ambat
Lexington, KY
Director: Dr. James E. Lumpp Jr., Professor of Electrical Engineering
Lexington, KY
2008

MASTER’S THESIS RELEASE

I authorize the University of Kentucky
Libraries to reproduce this thesis in
whole or in part for purposes of research.

Signed: Shadab Gopinath Ambat
Date:

02/29/2008

To my parents…

Acknowledgements

First of all I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. James E. Lumpp, Jr., for his patience and
guidance throughout this work and for allowing me to be a part of the IDEA Lab. The
knowledge and experience I gained while working under him will be invaluable. I would like
to thank Dr. William R. Dieter for being a part of my graduate committee and for teaching a
very interesting Real-Time and Embedded Systems course. It acted as the necessary catalyst
in my desire to work in the area. I am also thankful to Dr. Todd J. Hastings for serving in my
committee and for teaching an excellent course on Solid-State Electronics. Although I did not
get a chance to pursue the field further, the experience was certainly rewarding.
Thanks to Gordon Hollingworth and Miguel Silva for their previous work with JBits and also
to Gonçalo Furtado for his prompt help. They provided some form of assistance in an
otherwise support-less community.
I would like to thank Yehya, Samir, and Rama for the time and effort they have spent in
checking the thesis for any mistakes and for the valuable feedback they provided. Last, but
not least, I would like to thank my mother and my friends. Their everlasting support
contributed in more ways than one and made this all possible.

iv

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents .....................................................................................................................v
List of Figures........................................................................................................................ vii
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... ix
1

Introduction......................................................................................................................1
1.1
Background ............................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)...................................................... 2
1.1.2
The Single Event Upset (SEU) Problem........................................................... 4
1.2
Objective ................................................................................................................... 7
1.3
Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................... 8

2

System Overview..............................................................................................................9
2.1
Introduction............................................................................................................... 9
2.2
The CubeSat Standard............................................................................................... 9
2.3
System Overview .................................................................................................... 10
2.3.1
Detector Subsection ........................................................................................ 11
2.3.2
SEU Subsection .............................................................................................. 11
2.3.3
Detection Unit CPU ........................................................................................ 12
2.3.4
Flight Computer .............................................................................................. 12

3

Radiation Detector Options ..........................................................................................13
3.1
Introduction............................................................................................................. 13
3.2
Space Radiation Environment................................................................................. 13
3.2.1
The Van Allen Radiation Belts ....................................................................... 13
3.2.2
Cosmic Rays ................................................................................................... 17
3.2.3
Solar Wind ...................................................................................................... 18
3.2.4
Solar Flares and Coronal Mass Ejections ....................................................... 20
3.3
Radiation Detector Types ....................................................................................... 21
3.3.1
Geiger-Müller (GM) Tube .............................................................................. 21
3.3.2
Scintillators ..................................................................................................... 24
3.3.3
Semiconductor Detectors ................................................................................ 28

4

Single Event Upsets and Their Effects on FPGAs ......................................................34
4.1
Introduction............................................................................................................. 34
4.2
Single Event Effects................................................................................................ 34
4.3
Other Radiation Effects........................................................................................... 35
4.3.1
Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Effects.................................................................. 35

v

4.3.2
Spacecraft Charging........................................................................................ 36
4.4
SEU Mechanism ..................................................................................................... 37
4.5
Factors Inducing SEUs ........................................................................................... 38
4.5.1
Trapped Particles ............................................................................................ 38
4.5.2
Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) Particles............................................................ 39
4.5.3
Particles from Solar Flares.............................................................................. 39
4.5.4
Atmospheric Neutrons .................................................................................... 40
4.5.5
Radioactive Materials ..................................................................................... 40
4.6
Effects of SEUs on FPGAs ..................................................................................... 40
4.6.1
Upset in a Basic SRAM Cell .......................................................................... 40
4.6.2
SEU Configuration Error Modes .................................................................... 42
4.7
SEU Mitigation Techniques.................................................................................... 46
4.7.1
Technology-Based Techniques....................................................................... 46
4.7.2
Design-Based Techniques............................................................................... 47
5

Implementation of the XHWIF Interface ....................................................................52
5.1
Introduction............................................................................................................. 52
5.2
JBits......................................................................................................................... 52
5.3
Virtex-II Evaluation Board ..................................................................................... 54
5.4
The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) Interface...................................................... 56
5.5
XHWIF Implementation for the Virtex II Board.................................................... 59
5.5.1
The JTAG Scan Chain .................................................................................... 59
5.5.2
Host PC-Board Communication Interface ...................................................... 61
5.5.3
The Java Native Methods................................................................................ 62
5.5.4
The XHWIF Interface ..................................................................................... 68

6

Testing Methodology .....................................................................................................69
6.1
Introduction............................................................................................................. 69
6.2
SEU Detection Logic .............................................................................................. 69
6.3
Test Procedure ........................................................................................................ 72
6.3.1
Phase I: Fault-Free Operation ......................................................................... 72
6.3.2
Phase II: Fault Injection .................................................................................. 75
6.4
Results..................................................................................................................... 79

7

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................81
7.1
Summary ................................................................................................................. 81
7.2
System Implementation .......................................................................................... 82
7.3
Future Directions .................................................................................................... 83

Appendix A: Virtex II JTAG Registers and Supported Instructions ...............................85
Appendix B: Virtex II Selected Configuration Specifics....................................................88
Glossary ..................................................................................................................................94
References...............................................................................................................................96
Vita ........................................................................................................................................101
vi

List of Figures

Figure 1: A Commercial Pancake-Type Geiger-Müller Probe ................................................. 1
Figure 2: FPGA Block Diagram [31]........................................................................................ 2
Figure 3: CLB Slice for the Virtex II [31] ................................................................................ 3
Figure 4: The Virtex 5 FPGA ................................................................................................... 4
Figure 5: KySat1 ..................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 6: System Block Diagram............................................................................................ 11
Figure 7: The Van Allen Radiation Belts ............................................................................... 14
Figure 8: The Explorer I Satellite Launching on a Redstone-Jupiter C Rocket [9]................ 14
Figure 9: The Solar Wind [10]................................................................................................ 19
Figure 10: Solar Flare (Left) and a Coronal Mass Ejection (Right) [10]................................ 20
Figure 11: Geiger-Müller Tube Circuit Diagram.................................................................... 22
Figure 12: Different Types of Geiger-Müller Tubes. Thin Wall (Hot Dog-Type) (Left), EndWindow (Center) and Pancake Style (Right) [51].................................................................. 23
Figure 13: Typical Scintillator Detector Arrangement ........................................................... 25
Figure 14: P-N Diode Detector Circuit................................................................................... 29
Figure 15: Si PIN Diodes [22] ................................................................................................ 30
Figure 16: RADFET Operation .............................................................................................. 31
Figure 17: A 4-Transistor RADFET Chip with Bonded Wires to read the Dose Measurements
[25].......................................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 18: The South Atlantic Anomaly [29] ......................................................................... 39
Figure 19: 6-Transistor SRAM Storage Cell .......................................................................... 41
Figure 20: PIP Failure Modes ................................................................................................. 42
Figure 21: An Example of an LUT Error................................................................................ 43
Figure 22: A MUX Defect ...................................................................................................... 44
Figure 23: A Simplified IOB Element [35] ............................................................................ 45
Figure 24: An Error in an IOB Element [35].......................................................................... 45
Figure 25: TMR Block Diagram............................................................................................. 47
Figure 26: Implementation of TMR for State-Dependent Logic [36] .................................... 48
Figure 27: An Example of Temporal Redundancy ................................................................. 49
Figure 28: A Temporal Sampling Latch [37] ......................................................................... 49
Figure 29: Configuration Frames in the Virtex II [38] ........................................................... 51
Figure 30: JBits Execution...................................................................................................... 53
Figure 31: The Virtex-II Evaluation Board ............................................................................ 54
Figure 32: Boundary-Scan Architecture ................................................................................. 56
Figure 33: TAP Controller State Diagram [38] ...................................................................... 58
Figure 34: Boundary-Scan Chain on the Virtex II Board ....................................................... 60
Figure 35: Parallel Cable III [43]............................................................................................ 60
Figure 36: Parallel Cable III Schematic [43] .......................................................................... 61
Figure 37: Flowchart for Fetching Device IDs ....................................................................... 63
Figure 38: FPGA Configuration Flowchart ............................................................................ 65
Figure 39: Flowchart showing a Readback Sequence ............................................................ 67

vii

Figure 40: SEU Detection Logic............................................................................................. 70
Figure 41: Screenshot of the Java Test Program .................................................................... 71
Figure 42: Files used for Bitstream Verification [38]............................................................. 74
Figure 43: A Detailed Look at the CLB Slice (Top Half) [31]............................................... 76
Figure 44: Error File Structure................................................................................................ 77
Figure 45: Proposed System Implementation ......................................................................... 82
Figure 46: Packet Header Types ............................................................................................. 88
Figure 47: The STAT Register ............................................................................................... 92

viii

List of Tables

Table 1: Comparison between Radiation-Hardened and Commercial FPGAs......................... 6
Table 2: Comparison between Commonly-Used Scintillator Materials ................................. 27
Table 3: Board Configuration Mode Settings......................................................................... 55
Table 4: Fault-Injection Test Results...................................................................................... 78
Table 5: Virtex II JTAG Instructions...................................................................................... 85
Table 6: JTAG Registers for the Virtex II .............................................................................. 86
Table 7: Virtex II Configuration Register Set......................................................................... 89
Table 8: CMD Register Codes................................................................................................ 91
Table 9: Description of STAT Register Bits........................................................................... 92

ix

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background
Advancement in space technology has prompted a significant effort to be dedicated
towards understanding and characterizing the effects of ionizing radiation. Apart from the
hazards such radiation poses to humans, the errors that it induces in electronic devices
and circuits can lead to abnormalities in critical spacecraft modules. Such effects have
been observed in the past in endeavors like Voyager-1 and the Hubble Space Telescope
[1] [55] and have been the motivation for several projects aimed at preventing similar
occurrences in future.

Figure 1: A Commercial Pancake-Type Geiger-Müller Probe

Radiation in space can arise from sources such as cosmic rays, the Van Allen radiation
belts, solar phenomena etc. and can be measured by means of sensors like Geiger-Müller
(GM) tubes or semiconductor detectors. These devices can detect different types of
radiation and can also measure attributes such as the dose amount or particle energy
levels. Figure 1 shows a commercial radiation detector from United Nuclear™ that is
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capable of measuring alpha, beta and gamma radiation. The sensing element consists of a
pancake-type GM detector.
1.1.1

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)

FPGAs are semiconductor devices that can be user-programmed with a logic function.
The function can range from common structures such as arithmetic logic units or
microprocessors to custom application-specific logic. Their inherent re-programmability
feature has been fully exploited for prototyping purposes. The FPGA architecture, that
makes all this possible, consists of two key functional blocks – the configurable logic
block (CLB) and a switch matrix that forms the interconnections between them. Some
devices can also contain additional blocks such as an Input Output Block (IOB) that acts
as an interface between the device and the package pins. The block diagram of a typical
FPGA (Virtex™ II from Xilinx™) is shown in Figure 2 [31].

Figure 2: FPGA Block Diagram [31]
The CLB is the heart of the FPGA, and it normally consists of look-up tables (LUTs) and
other low-level logic elements such as logic gates, storage elements, multiplexers
2

(MUXs) etc. The CLB in case of a Virtex II FPGA for instance, consists of 2 tri-state
buffers and 4 similar slices with each slice containing a pair each of 4-input function
generators, carry logic, multiplexers, storage elements and a few logic gates, shown in
Figure 3 [31]. The function generators can be configured as either one of a 4-input LUT,
a 16-bit distributed SelectRAM, or a 16-bit shift register. CLBs are arranged in the form
of an array with the programmable interconnects (switch matrix) providing the necessary
connections between different blocks based on the implemented function. Other than
these, devices can also contain blocks to facilitate design development such as random
access memory (RAM) structures, multipliers, clock managers or sometimes even highend structures such as microprocessors.

Figure 3: CLB Slice for the Virtex II [31]
The flow one usually follows in order to program an FPGA with a desired logic design
can be divided into three steps. The design is first created using a hardware description
language such as Verilog or VHDL. This is then utilized in generating a low-level device
specific bitstream file. The final step is to download the bitstream onto the configuration
memory of the FPGA, which individually defines the behavior of the CLBs and
corresponding interconnects needed to implement the design. The configuration memory
can be based on static RAM (SRAM), flash or antifuse structures. Other than the

3

configuration memory, the device also consists of user memory which is used to store
design-related data such as register states.
FPGAs have gained popularity in recent years particularly in aerospace applications. One
of the major reasons being the prospect of performing post-launch design optimizations
or changes in spacecraft objectives. Present line of commercial FPGAs are capable of
integrating powerful embedded processors and several common intellectual property
cores that provide a complete system-on-chip solution. FPGAs that contain dedicated
multiplier blocks are particularly suited as co-processors for computation-intensive
applications such as digital signal processing. A good example is the Virtex 5 which is
the latest in the Virtex series of FPGAs. The device shown in Figure 4 is built on a 65 nm
process and includes 288 dedicated DSP blocks, each block consisting of a 25 bit x 18 bit
multiplier and a 48 bit adder/subtractor/accumulator. Other features include 4 embedded
Ethernet MAC blocks capable of implementing 1000 Base-X (Gigabit Ethernet)
implementation, and a dedicated block that provides PCI-Express functionality [3].

Figure 4: The Virtex 5 FPGA

1.1.2

The Single Event Upset (SEU) Problem

A particularly prominent effect of radiation pertaining to electronics is the SEU,
identified as a change in state occurring when a high-energy particle collides against a
sensitive node of a micro-electronic device. These changes in voltage levels can in-turn
lead to potentially destructive events such as latch-ups. Recent advancements in the
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semiconductor industry have led to the fabrication of highly scaled devices. These
devices exhibit an increased sensitivity to SEUs due to a reduced feature size and a
proportional increase in device density.
In the case of programmable logic devices such as FPGAs, SEU effects can be much
more severe. Since FPGAs utilize a configuration memory array to define the logic
function, an SEU occurring in a single bit in the array can lead to an unexpected
alteration of the original design. The SRAM structure in particular, that commonly forms
the configuration memory of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FPGAs, is known to be
highly susceptible to SEUs [2]. Hence certain accommodations need to be made in order
to use these devices for space applications.The industry solution to SEUs is radiationhardening. These enhanced devices are basically derived from similar commercial
versions with the underlying difference usually lying in the manufacturing technology or
in the implementation of redundant logic to counter SEU events. The downsides of using
such radiation-hardened devices are:
•

These devices consume more power

•

Are more expensive

•

Are typically slower than the commercial version

•

Have a reduced effective design area

Moreover, while hardening can reduce the occurrence of SEUs, the device is not
completely immune to them. This argument particularly holds true for rad-hardened
versions based on the SRAM architecture of COTS technologies [5]. To elucidate the
tradeoffs involved with hardening, a comparison is provided in Table 1 between a radhardened Virtex II QPro FPGA (XQR2V1000) and its commercial counterpart, the Virtex
II FPGA (XC2V1000). The first significant point to note is that the QPro was released
more than 3 years later with no significant design changes. To provide a better basis for
assessment the Virtex 4 device, released in the same year as the QPro, is also included in
the comparison.
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Table 1: Comparison between Radiation-Hardened and Commercial FPGAs

Device and Package Type

Virtex II QPro

Virtex II

Virtex 4

XQR2V1000-4

XC2V1000-6

XC4VLX25-12

BG5751

BG575

FF6682

May, 2004

Jan, 2001 [4]

Sep, 2004

150 nm

150 nm

90 nm

3,753,432 bits

4,082,592 bits

7,819,520 bits

1.5 V

1.5 V

1.2 V

100 mA (Typical)

12 mA (Typical)

77 mA (Typical)

500 mA (Max)

250 mA (Max)

N/A (Max)

360 MHz

450 MHz

500 MHz

328

328

448

31 mm x 31 mm

31 mm x 31 mm

27 mm x 27 mm

$4,091.00

$446.00

$462.50

Release Date
Process Technology
Bitstream size
Core Power Supply Voltage
(VCCINT)
Quiescent VCCINT Supply
Current (ICCINTQ)
DCM3 Max Input Clock
Frequency (using DLL4)
Available I/Os
Size
Price5

Notes:
1. BG – Standard Ball Grid Array (BGA)
2. FF – Flip-Chip Fine-Pitch BGA
3. DCM – Digital Clock Manager
4. DLL – Delay-Locked Loop
5. Prices from NuHorizons™ and Avnet™

Though built to be structurally similar to the Virtex II, the QPro still shows some
discrepancies, such as a smaller bitstream size and higher power consumption. A higher
speed grade was used for the Virtex II (-6) to emphasize the fact that the QPro has only
one speed option (-4). Also notice how the QPro compares to the Virtex 4 that has more
than twice the number of configuration bits translating to more logic resources. It should
be mentioned here that the XC4VLX25 is one of the lower end versions of the Virtex 4.
Finally the rad-hardened device is nearly 10 times more expensive making it unsuitable
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for low-budget projects. Thus several applications might find it more practical to use
COTS FPGAs.
The application of this work is in determining the feasibility of using these devices in
spacecraft systems. Although the associated benefits of COTS devices make them
attractive options, their higher vulnerability to SEUs makes it necessary to incorporate
fault recovery techniques. The mechanism employed here makes use of the FPGA
readback/reconfiguration features to achieve this. Also, in our case these functions will be
implemented by a microcontroller hence the unit that manages the process needs to be
deployable on an embedded platform. For this purpose a set of Java classes known as the
JBits Application Programming Interface (API) was selected. JBits provides the
capability of designing and/or modifying circuits for Xilinx Virtex devices. Apart from
inheriting the advantages of Java, a useful feature of JBits is that it can be used to
examine and even configure individual FPGA CLBs. The main requirement to run JBits
is a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Several implementations of the JVM have been
specifically customized for microcontrollers and could therefore be used to execute it.
Santiago Leon from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University was able to
successfully run JBits on a LEON RISC processor through the Waba JVM [7].

1.2 Objective
The motivation behind this work is to incorporate a COTS FPGA in a satellite payload to
determine its behavior in high-radiation space environments, i.e. its exhibited SEU rate.
A radiation detector was also included in the design so as to be able to quantify the SEU
counts based on the surrounding radiation levels.
The main aim of this thesis is to develop the framework for the major sections of the
payload and thereby aid in the final implementation.

The first section namely the

radiation detector module requires the selection of a suitable sensor. GM tubes as well as
other popular sensor options will be examined, describing their operating mechanisms
and typical characteristics. The second section is the SEU module that will monitor the
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FPGA for SEU instances and consequently remove them by applying mitigation
techniques. The JBits package chosen herein plays two major roles in this work. The first,
and what originally prompted its selection, is in simulating the SEUs. Since the cost for
using a cyclotron facility is particularly high, the faults are injected by directly modifying
the bitstream and performing a run-time reconfiguration. The second function is in
identifying and correcting any occurring SEUs in the bitstream. This is done by
performing a readback whenever the logic on the FPGA detects an SEU, recording the
bits that were affected, and reconfiguring the device with the correct bitstream. A test
environment was developed for this intent that made use of the Xilinx Virtex-II
Evaluation Board from Avnet™, populated with a Virtex-II FPGA. Details on the setup
will be given in a later chapter.

1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces the CubeSat standard along with the Kentucky
Satellite (KySat) project. An overview of the proposed system for the final design is also
given in a later section. Chapter 3 describes the major radiation sources that are likely to
affect the payload and examines several commonly used radiation detectors. Chapter 4
explains SEU concepts and various factors that can generate them. The effects that SEUs
tend to have on FPGAs are then presented along with a list of applicable mitigation
strategies. JBits makes use of the Xilinx HardWare InterFace (XHWIF) to communicate
with the board. Chapter 5 is thus dedicated to explaining the process used in creating this
interface and the components involved therein. The testing methodology that was
followed to generate and consequently detect faults in the FPGA bitstream is then
provided in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis along with suggestions
for future improvements.
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Chapter 2
System Overview

2.1 Introduction
The final payload implementation is expected to be carried out for a CubeSat class
satellite. This chapter describes these satellites along with their main features. This is
followed by a description of the overall system.

2.2 The CubeSat Standard
The CubeSat standard was designed at Stanford University and California Polytechnic
State University (Cal Poly), and defines electrical, structural, operational, and testing
specifications for a 1 kg, 10 cm cube-shaped satellite dubbed as a CubeSat [40]. Alternate
designs utilizing double (2 kg) or even triple (3 kg) configurations can also be used. The
launch is managed by Cal Poly by means of a standardized deployment system known as
the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD). The P-POD can carry up to three single
CubeSats and acts as the interface between the launch vehicle and the CubeSats. Its main
purpose is to ease integration into any launch vehicle. This allows the CubeSats to be
deployed as secondary or tertiary payloads at a lower cost.
CubeSats are typically launched in a Low-Earth Orbit and have become a popular lowcost option particularly for university missions. The community consists of over 80
universities and corporations world-wide with several companies providing off-the-shelf
components to facilitate CubeSat designs.
A possible candidate for carrying the payload described in this work is the Kentucky
Satellite (KySat). KySat is a state-wide effort by universities in Kentucky, to provide
rapid access to space for small payloads. KySat1 is planned as the first of many launches
9

expected to have more ambitious payloads and spacecraft bus capabilities. The payload
on KySat1 consists of a VGA camera and an experimental S-Band radio for highbandwidth communication. It is expected to be launched in 2008 and while further details
on its orbit are not available at present, certain passage over Kentucky rules out orbits
with inclinations less than 40 degrees. The active lifespan of the satellite is expected to
be 18 months, though it will remain in orbit for approx. 10-15 years [40].

Figure 5: KySat1

2.3 System Overview
A basic block diagram for the envisioned system is given in Figure 6. A discussion of the
individual sections along with the expected dataflow between them ensues.
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Figure 6: System Block Diagram

2.3.1

Detector Subsection

This subsection will consist of one of the radiation detectors that will be discussed later
on. Each of the sensors has their own strengths and the selection will need to be based on
optimality towards fulfillment of mission goals. For instance, GM tubes provide a simple
and robust solution, in addition to being cost-effective, while solid-state detectors such as
PIN diodes offer a much better resolution and are also able to provide a measure of the
incident particle energy.
2.3.2

SEU Subsection

The device under test (DUT) for the SEU module will consist of a Virtex II FPGA. A
Virtex II Pro was initially considered but it contained several enhanced features that were
deemed unnecessary for our current requirements. Another reason that had prompted this
change was that JBits has not yet been implemented for this series. The DUT will be
programmed with a logic function to detect SEU events. The simplest approach consists
of two identical logic slices that are fed with the same test pattern. Their outputs are then
constantly compared for mismatches occurring due to SEUs.
An additional PROM will also be required to store the bitstreams needed for
configuration and SEU detection/correction. FPGA configuration can either be
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completely managed by the microcontroller, or it can alternatively be configured directly
from the PROM. The second method can be faster especially if done via a parallel
SelectMAP interface, and can be employed during power-up or in cases when power
cycling is required to correct the errors.
2.3.3

Detection Unit CPU

A principal requirement for the microcontroller selected as the CPU for the SEU and
Detector Subsections is that it should have sufficient memory to be able to run JBits. This
includes memory for the JVM implementation and the underlying real-time operating
system. Part of the code can also reside in the PROM. The primary functions of the
microcontroller will be to generate a measure of the radiation based on the sensor output,
and to detect and count the number of SEU events, optionally recording the bits that were
affected. These can then be transmitted to the ground-station as data packets along with a
timestamp.
2.3.4

Flight Computer

This block will be the CPU for the main payload of the satellite and will control most of
the system operations. These will for example include tasks such as management of the
power system, communication radio, etc. For KySat1, the power system consists of a
solar cell array as the primary power source along with a backup battery supply.
Communication with the ground-station is established through a UHF and VHF antenna
for transmitting and receiving respectively. More information on the implementation can
be found in [40]. The data on the radio com-link from our perspective will typically
consist of:
•

Commands from the ground-station.

•

Periodic or on-demand updates on the SEU count.

•

Periodic or on-demand transmission of the measured particle count and/or
absorbed radiation dose.

•

Periodic transmission of system status information.
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Chapter 3
Radiation Detector Options

3.1 Introduction
This chapter will study the most common radiation detectors describing their concept of
operation and features. However, before proceeding it is essential to be aware of the
radiation setting that the payload is to be deployed in.

3.2 Space Radiation Environment
The radiation environment in space is affected by several elements and the type of orbit,
altitude, and inclination of the payload decide which of these play an important role
during its active time in space. Apart from their function in detector dose measurements,
these sources are also important from an SEU perspective as will be discussed in the
following chapter. The payload in our case is expected to be launched at a Low Earth
Orbit (LEO), defined by NASA as an orbit that extends from 80 km – 2,000 km above
the earth’s surface [46]. Other common orbits include:
•

Medium Earth Orbit (MEO): Orbits that lie between 2,000 km to 35,786 km.

•

Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO): Orbits at an altitude of 35,786 km having a
period equal to the earth’s rotational period.

•

Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO): Orbits with a low perigee of approx. 1,000 km
and an apogee of 35,786 km. Their inclination is typically between 50 and 70
degrees.

3.2.1

The Van Allen Radiation Belts

The Van Allen Belts are composed of two toroidal bands of energetic particles trapped
due to the earth’s magnetosphere, shown in Figure 7. The inner belt extends from 1,000
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km – 10,000 km and consists mainly of high-energy protons while the outer belt, made
predominantly from trapped electrons believed to have been injected from the solar wind,
lies at an altitude of about 15,000 km – 30, 000 km [8]. The gap between the two belts,
designated as the ‘safe zone’ or the ‘Van Allen Belt slot’, has a much lower particle count
and is particularly significant to satellites having MEOs. The zone is created by particle
interactions with radio waves generated from lightning. This process reduces the particle
energy, eventually resulting in their harmlessly dissipating in the earth’s atmosphere.

Inner Belt

Outer Belt

Figure 7: The Van Allen Radiation Belts

Figure 8: The Explorer I Satellite Launching on a Redstone-Jupiter C Rocket [9]
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The inner belt was first discovered by Explorer I and later confirmed by Explorer III.
Both missions were launched by NASA in 1958 under Dr. James Van Allen. The outer
belt was later discovered in the same year by Pioneer III [47]. All three missions used a
Geiger-Müller (GM) tube as the radiation detector.
Though the earth's atmosphere restricts the belts from directly affecting surface life, their
effects are still visible. The Aurorae Borealis (Northern Lights) for instance are caused
due to the trapped particles (electrons) entering the earth’s atmosphere through the
geomagnetic tail, which is the region of the belts closest to the earth. The electrons impart
energy through collisions to atmospheric elements that in-turn release the energy as light.
Emission from oxygen for example is green, while nitrogen emits a reddish glow.
Radioactive neutrons generated by collision of cosmic rays with the atmosphere, decay
and produce protons as by-products forming the inner belt. The AE-8/AP-8 Trapped
Particle Flux Maps from NASA [11] estimate the particle energies in the belts to be 0.04
MeV – 7 MeV for electrons and 0.1 MeV – 400 MeV for protons. These flux maps have
been the standard used by spacecraft designers for several decades now. Known
limitations exist however and thus a new AE-9/AP-9 model is currently being developed
by NASA and several other partners. The new model will include ions and is expected to
cover particles with a broader energy range [44].
The particle fluxes can fluctuate due to effects from solar events such as flares or from
man-made causes (nuclear explosions). These can at times even introduce artificial
radiation belts. A classic example of one such incident and the damage caused therein is
Starfish Prime, a nuclear test conducted by the United States on July 9, 1962. The test,
occurring at an altitude of 400 km, inserted an artificial belt of high-energy electrons (up
to 7 MeV) into the inner Van Allen belt. Effects of the belt were observable for five
years, nearly eight years in some areas [16]. Several satellites failed as a result of the
unexpected increase in radiation [12]:
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•

Ariel I (US/UK)

Ariel I, launched in April 1962, was a satellite designed by NASA to carry six British
payloads to study the relationship between the ionosphere and solar radiation. Four
days after the explosion its operation became irregular due to the accelerated
degradation of its solar cells caused by the electrons from the belt. Other effects
included overloading of the cosmic ray particle counter circuitry and a consequent
weakening of the detector [13].
•

Transit 4B (US)

Transit 4B was a US Navy navigation satellite launched in November 1961. It
stopped transmitting 25 days following the test due to a sharp decrease in solar cell
output.
•

TRAAC (US)

The Transit Research and Attitude Control (TRAAC) satellite was launched on the
same launch vehicle as the Transit 4B to test gravity-gradient stabilization in Transit
satellites. It also shared the same fate as the Transit 4B, failing to transmit 38 days
after the explosion due to solar cell degradation.
•

Injun I (US)

Built to study the natural and artificial radiation belts, auroras, and other geophysical
phenomena, Injun I was launched in June 1961. Its active transmission ended in
March 1963, longer than the other 3 satellites, owing to a power supply designed to
withstand higher degradation [14].
•

Cosmos V (Russia)

It was launched in May 1962, to study the upper layers of the earth’s atmosphere, and
was used to collect data from the artificial belt for a period of 4 months. Only indirect
information is provided on the power sources of the satellite.
•

Telstar I (US)

Telstar I was the first active, direct relay communications satellite, and was launched
in July 1962 on the day following the Starfish blast. It was designed by Bell
Laboratories and funded by AT&T. An increase in radiation intensity caused from
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Starfish and a Russian nuclear test in October 1962 led to the failure of some
transistors in the command system and it stopped responding in November 1962.
Although a workaround managed to reactivate the satellite, the transmitter could only
handle intermittent transmissions before finally failing on February 21, 1963 [15].
There are numerous instances of satellite failures induced by the radiation belts and those
mentioned above only demonstrated the ones that were specifically due to Starfish. An
upside of the Van Allen belts is that they provide some level of protection against solar
winds and cosmic rays by limiting the number of particle collisions instigated by them in
the atmosphere.
3.2.2

Cosmic Rays

Cosmic rays consist of energetic particles that originate from outside the earth’s
atmosphere. They were discovered in 1912 by Victor Hess. He measured the background
ionization rate on a balloon and found that it increased with altitude, concluding that this
was due to radiation from sources outside the atmosphere, later named ‘cosmic rays’.
Cosmic rays comprise:
•

Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs): They consist of particles originating from outside
the solar system.

•

Anomalous Cosmic Rays (ACRs): These are particles originating from within the
interstellar space in the heliosheath.

•

Solar Energetic Particles: They are generated from solar events such as solar
flares.

This section will only deal with GCRs, since ACR particles have comparatively lower
energies and speeds. Solar energetic particles will be studied in the following sections.
GCRs are composed of approximately 90% (hydrogen) protons, 9% alpha particles
(helium) and 1% ionized nuclei of various elements. About 1% of cosmic rays particles
consist of electrons. Ions of elements having an atomic number (Z) 1 ≤ Z ≤ 92 are known
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to be present in these rays [17]. Still, most of the ions are from lighter elements such as
hydrogen, helium, and to a lesser degree carbon and oxygen. Particles from heavier
elements (Z>25) such as iron are comparatively rare but nonetheless present. Despite
their lower fluxes, when compared to trapped particles, GCRs still possess high
penetrating properties due to their energy levels and are hence hostile towards
electronics. Particles can have energies ranging in hundreds of GeV and some have
energies well over that range. In fact the highest energy that was ever recorded for a
single cosmic ray particle was in 1991, by the Fly’s Eye cosmic ray detector of the
University of Utah, and was approx. 3x1020 eV [18]. Particles with such high energies are
believed to originate from outside the Milky Way as opposed to the majority of GCRs.
GCRs are energized while they are traveling through interstellar matter. On top of getting
ionized during this passage, the particles are also accelerated several times, probably by
supernova remnants to nearly the velocity of light [48]. Constant deflections from
magnetic fields scatter the particles evenly in all directions. This effectively makes it
impossible to determine the direction of their origin. Particles that are not fully ionized
before they reach the earth’s magnetosphere have a higher penetrating power. The earth’s
magnetic field can provide some degree of protection against GCRs to spacecrafts
depending on their inclination and altitude. The poles, however, are vulnerable on
account of the shape of the field lines. Like the trapped radiation belts, GCRs are also
affected by solar cycles with the particle level being lowest during solar maximum, and
reaching climax during solar minimum.
3.2.3

Solar Wind

The solar wind is the plasma of charged particles, namely electrons, protons and heavy
ions that originate from the Sun’s corona. Its existence was first hinted at by the fact that
comet tails always pointed away from the Sun irrespective of the comet’s direction of
motion. Ludwig Biermann from Germany suggested that this was due to a stream of
particles emitted by the Sun or ‘solar corpuscular radiation’ [49]. In 1958, Eugene Parker
of the University of Chicago while studying the coronal processes coined the term ‘solar
wind’ for this flow [50]. The extremely hot temperature of the Sun continuously heats the
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particles in the corona up to a point where they are capable of escaping from the Sun’s
gravitational pull. The high temperature results in a regulated plasma stream that travels
radially outward along the Sun’s magnetic field lines. The Sun’s rotation keeps the flow
of the wind continuous. Figure 9 shows the motion of solar wind through interplanetary
space.

Figure 9: The Solar Wind [10]
The composition of the solar wind resembles the element distribution of the Sun with
approx. 95% protons and the remaining 5% formed by helium and lesser doses of oxygen
and other elements. An equal number of electrons, also present, balance out the positive
charge. The particles are discharged by the Sun in all directions at energies of approx. 0.5
– 2 KeV/nucleon. They have extremely high speeds ranging from 300 km/s over
streamers to 900 km/s over coronal holes (dark regions), with an average of about 400
km/s (nearly 106 mph) [10]. Solar events such as coronal mass ejections and solar flares
cause disturbances in the wind and can result in an increase in charged particle density
and energy levels through geomagnetic storms. Apart from interfering with radio signals
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and an increased probability of satellite charging, an increased drag from such storms can
result in LEO satellites prematurely re-entering the atmosphere.
3.2.4

Solar Flares and Coronal Mass Ejections

Solar flares are tremendous explosions occurring on the surface of the Sun. They are
caused due to the abrupt release of energy in magnetically active regions around
sunspots. The energy discharge is accompanied by emission of accelerated protons,
electrons and heavy ion particles. The ions accelerated in this manner become the Solar
Energetic Particles mentioned earlier. The frequency of flare events coincides with the
solar cycle. The solar cycle is a major factor influencing space weather and has a period
of approx. 11 years, divided into 7 years of solar maximum and 4 years of solar
minimum. Increase in sunspots during solar maximum consequently result in a higher
number of flare events than during solar minimum. Prominent flares can generate
magnetic storms on Earth as discussed previously.

Figure 10: Solar Flare (Left) and a Coronal Mass Ejection (Right) [10]

Another solar phenomenon that can generate magnetic storms and energetic particles is a
Coronal Mass Ejection (CME). CMEs are huge bubbles of gas bound with intense
magnetic field lines that are ejected from the Sun. The shock waves are capable of
accelerating the particles to millions of km/hr. CMEs can disrupt the Earth’s
magnetosphere and are believed to be responsible for major storms on Earth. They are
usually associated with flare events but are known to occur even in their absence.
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3.3 Radiation Detector Types
Long-term exposure to radiation can be detrimental to a device. Monitoring the radiation
using radiation detectors can therefore give an indication as to the expected device
lifespan. The following units can be used to express the measure of radiation:
•

Roentgen (R): One Roentgen is defined as the amount of ionization required to
produce 1 electrostatic unit of charge in 1 cubic cm of air at standard temperature
and pressure.

•

Radiation absorbed dose (rad): Rad is a measure of the dose absorbed by a
material. 1 rad is equivalent to the dose required for 0.01 Joule of energy to be
absorbed per kg of matter. (The SI unit for this term is Gray (Gy). 1 Gy = 100
rads)

Several types of radiation sensors are utilized in spacecraft designs. Some of them are
more suited at measuring certain types of radiation than others. Commercial detectors are
mainly utilized to detect radiation from 3 types of sources:
1. Alpha Particles: They are positive particles that are emitted during alpha decay
and consist of 2 protons and 2 neutrons (helium nuclei).
2. Beta Particles: They are basically high energy electrons or positrons usually
produced from beta decay.
3. Gamma Rays: These are photons having the highest energy and frequency
(typically 1020 Hz and above) in the electromagnetic spectrum.
Some sensors can also be used to detect non-ionizing particles such as neutrons. This
section discusses the different sensors that are used in radiation measurement, along with
their innate strengths and weaknesses.
3.3.1

Geiger-Müller (GM) Tube

The GM tube was used in the Explorer missions to measure the radiation in the Van
Allen belts and is still widely used today. It was invented in 1908 by Hans Geiger as a
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device to detect alpha particles. In 1928, he improved the model with Walther Müller,
extending the detection to all types of ionizing radiation. The GM tube is a kind of a gasfilled radiation detector. Other detectors falling under this category are ionization
chambers and proportional counters. The pulses produced by the tube are usually counted
by a microcontroller or a CMOS counter to quantify the surrounding radiation
environment. Figure 11 shows a typical GM circuit.

Ionizing Radiation

GM Tube
Anode
Amplifier

To Counter

End Window
Inert Gas (Ne,Ar)
+ Quench Agent
(Halogen)

Cathode

High Voltage
Source

Figure 11: Geiger-Müller Tube Circuit Diagram
The outer surface of the tube is made of a conducting material like stainless steel that acts
as the cathode. The anode consists of a thin metal wire lying along the central axis of the
tube. The tube is filled with an inert gas such as neon or argon [20]. The tube shown here
is an end-window type with the window usually being manufactured from materials such
as mica, mylar, glass, or thin metals. Mica and glass are the most common types, with
mica being more sensitive and hence providing alpha particle detection but also being
more delicate. When radiation passes through the window, it ionizes the gas inside the
tube causing pairs of electrons and positive ions to be generated. The circuit is completed
when the electrons travel towards the anode and the ions towards the cathode. Since a
detectable signal is required, the anode is kept at a high potential of typically 500 – 900
V. This provides sufficient acceleration to the electrons to generate more electron-ion
pairs through collisions, resulting in an avalanche effect and thereby producing a large
pulse at the output. To prevent a continuous discharge a process called quenching is
employed. This involves either providing extra circuitry, or filling up the tube with a
quenching gas such as alcohol vapor or a halogen. The second method is fairly effective
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and is generally preferred. Also, halogen gas is normally used since it has a longer
lifetime than alcohol, which gradually gets broken down due to the discharge process.
Quenching correctly associates each pulse with a single particle. Depending on the pulse
amplitude, an amplifier might be necessary before feeding the pulses to a microprocessor
or other counting device. Current limiting resistors are usually needed when connecting
the high-voltage source; moreover a small capacitor blocks the output from the highvoltage source while transmitting the pulses. Additional components might include a
collimator that is used to prevent the tube from saturating in intense radiation regions by
limiting its field of vision [6]. Though being relatively easy to use, a known downside
that these detectors have is that they cannot discriminate between particles of different
energies. A fixed-amplitude output pulse is generated as long as the particle energy is
above the threshold for the tube. This can be countered by using highly sensitive
detectors such as scintillators that are capable of producing pulses of different amplitudes
based on incident particle energy.

Figure 12: Different Types of Geiger-Müller Tubes. Thin Wall (Hot Dog-Type) (Left),
End-Window (Center) and Pancake Style (Right) [51]

GM tubes are robust, cost-effective, and are frequently used for general-purpose radiation
detection. They can even be modified to detect neutrons by filling the tube with boron
trifluoride gas or providing an inner lining of boron. The interaction with boron nuclei
result in alpha particle generation which can consequently be detected. GM tubes can be
fairly small and light-weight and can come in different configurations. Figure 12 [51],
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shows 3 kinds of GM tubes manufactured by LND, INC™ and arranged from left to right
by increasing order of sensitivity.
•

Thin Wall (Hot Dog-Type): These are mainly used to detect beta and gamma
radiation. They are tough and inexpensive but usually have a lower sensitivity and
are unable to detect alpha particles.

•

End-Window: They are more sensitive than the hot dog type, and can detect
alpha radiation due to the addition of the mica/glass window. They can also come
in reasonably small sizes. However, they are slightly more expensive and the
window is rather delicate.

•

Pancake Style: The large mica window gives them a much better sensitivity than
the other two types particularly to low energy gamma photons. However they are
bulkier and can be quite heavy (the model shown in the Figure is more than 20
times heavier than the end-window type). Another shortcoming is that since the
window occupies nearly one entire side of the tube, they can be very fragile.

Overall the end-window type offers a good balance in terms of cost, sensitivity and size.
The model shown in the Figure is also the same one used in the MEROPE project [6]. It
is 35 mm long, with an 8.7 mm diameter and weighs only 6 grams. MEROPE was a
CubeSat developed at Montana State University that aimed at reproducing the Explorer I
mission, i.e. measure the radiation in the Van Allen belts using a Geiger tube. It was set
for launch on July 26, 2006 but unfortunately the Dnepr Soviet missile it was riding on
crashed shortly after launch. The efficacy of the design in measuring the radiation in the
belts could therefore not be determined. However, GM tubes have been successfully used
in numerous missions and as such are an especially viable option for our model.
3.3.2

Scintillators

Scintillation is the term used for a flash of light produced in a phosphor when it absorbs a
photon or an ionizing particle. This is the basic principle on which scintillators work.
When a charged particle or energetic photon enters the scintillation material, it transfers
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its kinetic energy to the medium by exciting atomic electrons to higher energy levels.
This energy is released as light in the visible or ultra-violet spectrum by the electron
when it returns to a lower energy state. A photoelectric transducer such as a
photomultiplier tube (PMT) then converts this to an electrical pulse. This is illustrated by
a typical diagram of a scintillation counter in Figure 13 [20], showing how these
detectors would normally be used for measurement applications. The scintillator output is
optically coupled to a PMT through a light tube. Since the light emitted by the scintillator
is proportional to the energy of the incident particle, they differ from GM tubes in that
they can not only detect an ionizing particle but also provide a measure of its energy. The
pulses from the PMT are provided to a multi-channel analyzer that records the pulse
amplitude and a counter then provides a measure of the particle count.

Scintillator

Light Tube
(optical
coupling)

Pre-Amplifier
and/or
Amplifier

Multi-channel
Analyzer

PMT

Radiation

Counter

Reflector
High Voltage
Source

Figure 13: Typical Scintillator Detector Arrangement

Measurement of gamma radiation is an indirect process that requires the generation of
charged particles. Gamma photons interacting with the atoms of the material can either
directly or indirectly, through Compton scattering or photoelectric processes, produce
electrons or positrons that are then detected through the normal process.
The sensing element can be of different materials namely liquids, crystalline solids, or
plastics. The main requirements are that the material should be transparent to its own
emitted radiation and that it should be efficient in energy conversion. The materials that
are most commonly used can be divided into two categories:
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1. Organic Materials
Organic materials are characterized as having a fast response due to short
luminescence decay times in order of a few nanoseconds. They are however not very
efficient. Materials in this category can be further classified into 3 types:
•

Liquids: The sensing material in this group consists of a primary scintillator
(solvent), a fluor and sometimes an additional emulsifier [52]. The fluor acts as a
wave shifter, absorbing the light emitted by the solvent (usually in the UV
spectrum) and shifting it to a different wavelength to ease detection. The entire
mixture is known as a ‘cocktail’. Materials such as p-phenylene oxide, pterphenyl and benzene can be used as solvents while the fluor includes substances
such as 2-methoxyethanol, toluene etc. Liquid scintillation counting has an
inherent disadvantage in that in order to detect radiation the radioactive sample
needs to be dissolved in the cocktail.

•

Plastics: Plastic scintillators have a similar material configuration consisting of a
polymer base such as polystyrene or polyvinyl toluene and a fluor. They are
inexpensive, robust and are capable of measuring α, β, γ or fast neutron particle
radiations. They are however susceptible to degradation.

•

Crystals: Naphthalene was one of the earlier organic crystals to be used as
scintillators. Most current scintillators though are made of anthracene or stilbene
crystals. Anthracene is known to have the best efficiency among all organic
scintillator materials [53]. Nonetheless, it is difficult to purify and its efficiency is
still just one-third of NaI(Tl).

2. Inorganic Crystals
Inorganic crystals are widely used these days since they have excellent efficiencies
due to higher densities and high-Z values of the constituent elements. Most of them
however have slow response times, limiting their effectiveness in high-flux
environments. Alkali halide salts such as sodium iodide (NaI) or cesium iodide (CsI)
are the most commonly used materials. Impurities called ‘activators’ are sometimes
added to improve efficiency of light emission usually in the form of thallium (Tl) to
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create NaI(Tl) and CsI(Tl) respectively. Glass is also sometimes used to build
scintillators. NaI(Tl) has a high efficiency and a near linear energy response, but it is
hygroscopic and vulnerable to mechanical shock [54].
A comparison between several common scintillator materials is listed in Table 2 [26].
NaI(Tl) has the highest efficiency but its decay time is 2 orders of magnitude more than
that of organic materials, hence the material selection needs to be dependent on the
implementing application.
Table 2: Comparison between Commonly-Used Scintillator Materials
Properties

NaI(Tl)

CsI(T1)

Glass

Liquid

Plastic

Density (g/cm3)

3.67

4.51

~3.5

0.9

1.03

Relative Light Output

1.00

0.45

0.15

0.4

0.25

Radiation Length (cm)

2.59

1.85

4

~45

40

Luminescence (nm)

410

530

395

425

400

Decay Time (ns)

230

1000

100

2

2

Refractive index

1.85

1.80

1.55

1.50

1.58

Hygroscopic

Yes

Slightly

No

No

No

The main advantages of scintillators over GM tubes are a higher sensitivity and the
ability to discriminate between different energy levels. On the other hand, they are
significantly more expensive and their operation is relatively more complex. In terms of
resolution, semiconductor detectors are far superior to either of the two.
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3.3.3

Semiconductor Detectors

Semiconductor or solid-state detectors operate on a similar mechanism as gaseous
ionization detectors in that they rely on particle interactions for the detection process.
They can provide excellent resolution and response times and can be rather compact.
However, they have a lower sensitivity when compared to scintillators and are as yet not
as widespread as GM tubes. They can also be fairly expensive. Different types of these
detectors exist with the basic operation remaining the same. The major ones are examined
below.
3.3.3.1 Intrinsic Semiconductors
This is the simplest arrangement for the device to act as a detector, and it essentially
consists of a pure semiconductor crystal (typically silicon (Si) or germanium (Ge)). When
a charged particle passes through the device, the energy it loses in its path is used in the
generation of electron-hole pairs. The detectors are normally placed between two
electrodes with an applied electric potential. This prevents the charge carriers from
recombining and their resultant drift due to the field creates an output pulse. Since the
energy required to produce an electron-hole pair is a function of the band-gap energy of
the material EG and is constant (EG = 3.6 eV (Si) and EG = 2.9 eV (Ge)), the number of
pairs generated gives a direct measure of the energy of the incident particle. Hence the
amplitude of the output pulse is proportional to the particle energy. Moreover the energy
required to generate the charge carriers is significantly less when compared to gaseous
detectors (~30 eV), which results in a better energy resolution.
A known complexity can arise if residual impurities are present in the Si/Ge crystals
since this results in a low resistivity [19]. This inhibits it from detecting low currents
generated from smaller particle concentrations. Nonetheless, improvements in modern
techniques have in recent years been able to provide highly refined semiconductor
crystals. High-Purity Ge (HPGe) detectors are typically used these days mainly for
measuring gamma radiation, but they are susceptible to noise due to thermal carrier
generation and need to be cooled at cryogenic temperatures. Another solution is to use
doping. A process known as drifting is used to produce Lithium (Li) drifted silicon
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known as Si(Li) and likewise Ge(Li) for germanium. Li drifting helps provide impurity
compensation [20] but Ge(Li) still needs to be cooled at liquid nitrogen temperatures to
be able to provide functional gamma radiation measurements. Compound structures such
as GaAs (Gallium Arsenide) and CdZnTe (Cadmium Zinc Telluride) are attractive future
options since they can be operated at approx. room temperatures.
3.3.3.2 P-N / PIN Diodes
The detector in this configuration consists of a reverse-biased p-n junction diode
normally in an OFF state as shown in Figure 14 [20]. When an energetic charged particle
is incident on the diode, it provides sufficient energy to generate electron-hole pairs,
reducing the width of the depletion region and eventually resulting in a current pulse.
This is provided to an external counting/pulse height analyzing circuit. These detectors
are normally not used to measure high energy particles since the depletion region is not
very thick. They measure energies in the range of approx. 1.5 MeV for electrons, 20 MeV
for protons, 80 MeV for alpha particles and only low energy gamma photons. The
detector frequently consists of multiple elements arranged in the form of a strip.

Figure 14: P-N Diode Detector Circuit
The addition of an extra intrinsic region between the p-n junction gives a p-i-n (PIN)
diode that has a better response. A larger depletion region also extends its range of
detection to higher energies. PIN diodes are sometimes used to detect neutron particles by
using a converter such as a polyethylene radiator [21]. The neutrons collide with the
radiator resulting in the generation of recoil protons with energies proportional to the
incident neutrons. These protons can then be normally detected by the diode. Figure 15
[22] shows Si PIN diodes that are used to measure beam intensities at the European
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Synchrotron Radiation Facility. They are custom-manufactured by Canberra-Eurisys™,
having a sensitive area of 3 mm x 8 mm (width x height) and a fairly low leakage current
(≤7 nA).

Figure 15: Si PIN Diodes [22]

PIN diodes have been used as rad-detectors in several space missions, some of which are
listed below:
•

GeneSat-1: A NASA CubeSat project to study genetic changes in bacteria during
spaceflight.

•

Galileo In-Orbit Validation Element-A (GIOVE-A): Developed in UK
(University of Surrey), its goals included acquiring the use of the frequencies
allocated by the International Telecommunications Union for Galileo and
monitoring the radiation environment of the orbits planned for the Galileo
constellation.

•

CORONAS-F: It was a solar observatory launched in 2001 as a joint effort
between several countries including Russia, Ukraine, UK and the US.
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3.3.3.3 RADFET
Radiation Sensitive FETs (RADFETs) are inherently enhancement p-channel MOSFETs
that provide a measure of the total accumulated dose in a material. In this case, the region
monitoring the measurement is the gate of the MOSFET. When radiation is incident on
the device, charge carriers are generated in the gate oxide region as seen in Figure 16
[23]. Some of these are lost due to recombination. Out of the free carriers, the electrons
are transported out of the oxide. The less mobile holes on the other hand travel towards
the substrate, several of them getting trapped in the process especially near the region of
the oxide-substrate interface. The net increase in the positive charge of the device results
in a relative change (∆VT) in the threshold voltage VT of the MOSFET. ∆VT increases as
a function of the radiation dose, and hence the total dose absorbed by the device can be
determined.

Figure 16: RADFET Operation
The simplest approach to using the RADFET in dose measurement would be to operate it
in saturation. The output voltage would then consist of VT and an additional component
due to the bias current. The RADFET is typically operated in 2 modes – active and
passive. In the active mode, the device is subjected to a positive gate bias which limits
carrier recombination, thus increasing the sensitivity of the device. Devices in this mode
are commonly used in radiotherapy applications. In the passive mode, the device has a
lower sensitivity since it is operated at zero gate bias. This however allows large dose
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measurements to be made, ideal for space dosimetry. Another advantage of this mode is
its low power consumption. The response for both modes can be represented as [24]:
∆VT = 0.04 D tox2 f (active mode)
∆VT ~ 0.0022 D0.4 tox2 (passive mode)
Where tox is the oxide thickness (µm), f is the fraction of generated holes that escape
recombination which is a function of the applied gate bias, and D is the dose (rad). Since
the first 2 are known device parameters, D can be determined.

Figure 17: A 4-Transistor RADFET Chip with Bonded Wires to read the Dose
Measurements [25]

Although their resolution is limited and not as good as some other detectors, RADFETs
are highly suited for high-dose space environments. RADFETs can be used as single
elements or in integrated chips containing several transistors of different sensitivities, to
differentiate between different radiation sources. Such a configuration is shown in Figure
17 [25] which consists of 4 transistors manufactured by REM Oxford™, UK. 2 of the
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transistors have sensitivities in the rad range and the other 2 in the Krad range. This is
obtained by using a tox of 0.95 µm and 0.13 µm respectively.
RADFETs are often times used with other detectors such as PIN diodes to give an
appraisal of the total dose. The GIOVE-A mentioned previously consisted of this
arrangement wherein two RADFETs were used for dosimetry, while a PIN diode was
used to measure proton fluxes. As with the other detector types mentioned earlier,
RADFETs can also be modified to increase their receptivity to neutrons, specifically by
enhancing the gate region with a polymeric or boron loaded substance.
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Chapter 4
Single Event Upsets and Their Effects on FPGAs

4.1 Introduction
This chapter will take a look at single event phenomena including hard and soft errors. A
detailed explanation of SEUs including their generation will be presented before
observing their consequences on FPGAs.

4.2 Single Event Effects
This section defines the various effects one might encounter due to single event
occurrences resulting from particles such as protons or heavy ions (Z≥2). These are based
on the definitions provided by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC)
association [27].
•

Single Event Effects (SEEs): Any observable or measurable change in state or
performance occurring in a microelectronic device, component or system that can
be digital, analog or optical, resulting from a single energetic particle strike. SEEs
comprise SEUs and several other effects defined below.

•

Single Event Upset (SEU): A soft error resulting from a transient signal induced
by a single energetic particle strike.

•

Single Event Transient (SET): A transitory voltage spike (change of state) at a
node of an integrated circuit resulting from single particle collisions.

•

Single Event Latch-up (SEL): An abnormal high-current state caused when
single energetic particles pass through sensitive regions of the device, resulting in
(in most cases) loss of device functionality.

•

Single Event Burnout (SEB): An event caused by a single particle collision
inducing a localized high-current state in a device, and resulting in its destruction.
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•

Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI): A loss of normal functionality of a
device that unlike SELs, does not require power cycling to restore device
operability or result in permanent damage as in SEBs.

•

Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR): An event where a single energetic particle
causes a breakdown in a MOSFET and a consequent formation of a conducting
path through its gate oxide.

•

Single Event Hard Error (SHE): An irreversible change in operation from a
single particle event normally resulting from a permanent damage to device
elements. These are usually caused by events such as destructive latch-ups or a
gate rupture.

This work was mainly conceived towards studying the SEU. This effect will therefore be
the object of our focus in the current chapter as well as during the development of the test
platform discussed at a later stage.

4.3 Other Radiation Effects
Besides SEEs, radiation can result in other abnormalities in microelectronic devices. The
two prominent ones are reviewed in this section.
4.3.1

Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Effects

TID effects are a result of cumulative charge deposited in the device material mainly in
the form of trapped charge in the insulating layers. The absorbed dose is a function of
orbit parameters namely time, inclination and altitude. This is a long-term radiation effect
unlike SEEs, and arises primarily from electrons, protons and resulting secondary
radiation in the form of bremsstrahlung photons. The electrons and protons mainly
originate from the radiation belts, and from solar events (flares).
TID can lead to device failure and its effects are seen as increased leakage currents,
timing skews or threshold shifts. The RADFET, explained in Chapter 2, utilizes these
very TID induced parametric shifts specifically in the threshold to provide a measure of
the total dose absorbed by a device. Incidentally, the satellites that experienced solar cell
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damage from the Starfish nuclear blast had failed due to intensified TID effects. TID
damage can be partially reduced by shielding that provides some protection against
electrons and low-energy protons or by enhanced manufacturing processes, as are
employed for several rad-hardened ICs. Rad-hardened devices for space applications are
in general expected to withstand a TID of 100-300 krad. The Virtex II QPro has a TID
tolerance of 200 krad (Si).
4.3.2

Spacecraft Charging

Spacecraft charging is defined as the buildup of charge in the spacecraft. The discharge
that follows as a result can cause structural damage to spacecraft components or can
cause functional abnormalities. Depending on the location at which it occurs, this can be
divided into [28]:
•

Surface Charging: Occurs when the spacecraft surface is charged relative to the
surrounding plasma. This can either be absolute, where the charge distribution
over the entire surface is uniform with respect to the ambient plasma, or
differential, wherein different areas of the satellite are charged to different
potentials.

•

Deep Dielectric Charging: Occurs due to charge buildup inside the spacecraft,
mainly due to high-energy electrons causing charge deposition in dielectric
materials.

The plasma environment, high-energy electrons from the radiation belts or the
photoelectrons generated due to solar photons, any of these can act as charging sources.
Damage is mainly caused through arc discharges, which occur when the field buildup,
resulting from differential or dielectric charging, go beyond the material breakdown
voltage. The currents associated with arcing are particularly high and can result in
permanent component damage through burnouts.
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4.4 SEU Mechanism
SEUs are inherently soft errors and as such non-destructive. In several cases however
they can lead to SEFIs or potentially destructive errors like SELs. The SEU process is
initiated when an ionized particle enters the micro-electronic material. The particle
interacts with the material atoms during its passage, losing its energy in the process. The
amount of energy transferred is given in terms of a Linear Energy Transfer (LET). An
LET is defined as ‘the amount of energy lost per unit path length by a charged particle as
it traverses a material’ [27]. Since the energy lost is proportional to the material density,
LET is usually expressed in units of MeV-cm2/mg. The energy transfer, results in the
creation of electron-hole pairs that drift in the presence of an electric field (funneling),
generating a current pulse that induces transient charges. If this occurs in the vicinity of a
sensitive node, the amount of charge deposited at the node determines the occurrence of
an SEU. In other words, an SEU will ensue if the deposited charge exceeds the critical
charge (Qcrit) for the node i.e. the minimum charge that produces a soft error. Qcrit is a
function of the feature size, specifically Qcrit α L2 for a device feature size of L x L [28].
Hence feature size scaling in modern chips has also increased their vulnerability to SEUs.
While heavy ions generate SEUs by direct ionization, protons typically do so through
nuclear reactions. These can be in the form of:
1. Elastic Collisions: Energy is transferred to a recoil (Si) nucleus.
2. Spallation: Target nucleus is split into lighter particles and a heavy recoil nuclei
ion.
Secondary particles from either of these reactions can then cause SEUs by the charge
deposition process explained previously. In case of spallation, the angle of incidence of
the original particle also need to be considered, as the charge deposition is higher at
certain angles. Given that neutrons are devoid of any charge, they rely entirely on either
of these two processes for generating SEUs.
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4.5 Factors Inducing SEUs
This section will discuss SEUs from the perspective of the various radiation particles that
produce them. The primary sources for these particles are the factors regulating the space
radiation weather that were mentioned in Chapter 2.
4.5.1

Trapped Particles

The trapped particle population consists of protons, electrons and heavy ions trapped in
the earth’s magnetosphere. However, due to the fact that electrons do not generate SEUs
[17] and trapped heavy ions do not posses sufficient penetration power to do so, we can
disregard them when dealing with SEUs.
The high-energy protons in the inner radiation belt are expected be the principal factor
governing SEU events for LEO satellites that encounter them several times a day.
Shielding against them provides only limited protection due to the weight restrictions
imposed by satellites. High density memory structures in particular, like SRAMs, exhibit
low threshold LETs (LETth) to protons. The particle population is affected by the solar
cycle and events such as flares. The number of trapped protons decreases during solar
maximum and increases during solar minimum. Flares can inject additional protons in the
belt, and can sometimes even lead to the formation of additional belts thereby increasing
the probability of SEU events.
A particular region of interest for LEOs is the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) shown in
Figure 18 [29]. This region is located off the coast of Brazil at an altitude of approx. 500
km and consists of intense concentrations of protons from the inner belt. Its existence at
that particular location arises due to the earth's magnetic field being offset from its center.
This results in the geomagnetic field strength being weakest in that region, allowing
particles from the inner belt to extend lower into the atmosphere. The map was taken at
approx. 560 km. This anomaly has caused failures in many satellites. The concentrated
environment can bring about an increase in SEU events, or even enhance TID effects.
The Roentgen Satellite (ROSAT) that provided this map had to turn off 2 of its particle
detectors while passing over this region to prevent them from getting damaged.
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Figure 18: The South Atlantic Anomaly [29]

4.5.2

Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) Particles

Protons and heavy ions originating from GCRs are another major source of SEUs. They
are of specific importance to high-altitude orbits like geostationary or highly-elliptical
orbits. In case of LEOs the radiation belts provide some degree of shielding from their
effects. The heavy ion component in GCRs is of particular significance and it contributes
to SEU events by means of direct ionization. The ions as such usually possess high
energy levels and can even result in multiple upsets. Their high penetrating properties,
especially in case of partially ionized ions, render shielding against them ineffective. The
particle fluxes exhibit a similar dependence to the solar cycle as trapped particles.
4.5.3

Particles from Solar Flares

Solar flares, though having a very low frequency of occurrence, are still important since
the particles they produce can have significantly high energies. Proton energies may go
up to a few 100 MeV while heavy ion particles can go to even higher energies ranging in
100s of GeV [17]. Heavy ion fluxes can in some cases be as much as four times higher
than corresponding GCR levels. Another effect of flare events is that the geomagnetic
storms they set off disrupt the earth’s magnetosphere. This can facilitate penetration for
lower energy cosmic particles hence heightening the chances of SEU events.
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4.5.4

Atmospheric Neutrons

Neutrons are generally produced as secondary particles through cosmic ray spallation
reactions in the atmosphere. They are mainly of concern for low (aircraft) altitude based
systems, since SEUs in spacecraft are primarily from protons and heavy ions. Their
energy levels typically range from 20 – 300 MeV [30] and some of them can be
transported to ground levels. Neutrons dominate SEU events occurring at aircraft
altitudes and are even known to affect electronics located at ground level. Apart from
generating SEUs, neutrons can also cause displacement damage resulting in lattice
defects in the device material. Shielding against neutrons is unfeasible since they are
capable of penetrating several feet of concrete. The maximum neutron flux is at an
altitude of about 15 km, known as the Pfotzer point.
4.5.5

Radioactive Materials

SEUs can sometimes result from radioactive impurities introduced in the microelectronic
device during manufacturing. This is usually in the form of low-energy α-particles that
are emitted from radioactive isotopes such as uranium-238, thorium-232 and their decay
products. These substances are typically present as impurities in package molding
compounds or in the chip metal. The α-decay can release particles with energies ranging
in a few MeV and as such can generate a large number of charge carriers along their
ionization path. This process is by and large independent of the altitude and is one of the
sources of ground-based SEU events. Although current technology has improved the
purity of packaging materials, trace amounts of such impurities are nonetheless present.

4.6 Effects of SEUs on FPGAs
4.6.1

Upset in a Basic SRAM Cell

SEUs are inherently transient, and might go undetected in several cases. But in storage
circuits like latches and memory structures these events get stored. The SRAM structure
that commonly acts as the configuration memory for FPGAs is based on the 6-transistor
storage cell. However, the cell is known to be vulnerable to SEUs [32], consequently
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compromising the functionality of the FPGA. Figure 19 shows a possibility of how an
SEU might affect the cell.
The nMOS pass gates T5 and T6 are used to read/write values to the cell. For a write
operation, bit is set to the desired logic, say ‘0’ and ~bit to logic ‘1’. The pass transistors
are then activated via the RD/WR Enable line and the value is latched in by the crosscoupled inverters. Similarly to read the state of the cell the pass gates are once again
enabled.

Figure 19: 6-Transistor SRAM Storage Cell
Now suppose that the cell holds a logic ‘0’ when a current pulse from a particle collision
arrives at node A. The pulse travels to the gate of T3 and if its magnitude is high enough,
is capable of turning on T3 thereby pulling node B to logic ‘0’. The positive feedback
ensures that the change propagates to the other two transistors, eventually resulting in a
logic ‘1’ getting stored in the cell. If the structure originally held a logic ‘1’, then a
similar event occurring at node B would result in a logic reversal. It is important to note
that the occurrence of such logic changes also depends on the design and a particle
collision might not necessarily result in a bit-flip.
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4.6.2

SEU Configuration Error Modes

As mentioned earlier, the FPGA memory is divided into user and configuration memory
and an SEU can affect either of the two. The former case results in an undefined state
getting latched in a register element. Though this might cause a temporary disruption in
normal functionality, the original design remains unchanged. In the latter case however,
bit-flips can cause an alteration of the logic and the affected area needs to be
reprogrammed to remove the fault. Faults in this category can be either in the routing,
logic resources or in the IOBs and will be further discussed.
4.6.2.1 Signal Routing Errors
The signal routing in case of SRAM-based FPGAs like the Virtex takes place through a
component known as the programmable interconnect point (PIP). It is essentially a pass
gate that controls routing between two wires in the device. SEUs can cause three types of
failures in PIPs [33]:

A

B
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B

C

D

C

D

(a) Original

(b) Open

A

B

A

B

C

D

C

D
(d) Conflict

(c) Bridge

Figure 20: PIP Failure Modes
Open: Let the fault-free mode consist of node B being driven by node A as shown in
Figure 20(a). In case of an open failure type, an SEU hit can cause the connection
between A and B to be severed as shown. This might translate to a logic resource being
effectively isolated from the design.

42

Bridge: In this scenario, the connection A-B is replaced by a new connection C-B. Node
B is now driven by a different driver causing an unknown change from the expected
implementation.
Conflict: The third type of failure involves a new link C-B being created while the
original connection is still intact. The outcome is a signal contention due to creation of
the wired-AND structure and an unknown logic value driving node B.
4.6.2.2 Errors in Logic Resources
Faults injected into CLB resources by SEU hits also fall into 3 categories based on the
resource affected [34]:
LUT Defect: The fault is caused in an LUT residing in a CLB element. Since LUTs are
usually used to implement logic gates and other combinatorial logic, this can cause a
modification of the logic function. Figure 21 illustrates this by showing how a bit-flip can
result in a 4-input OR gate implementation getting changed to a stuck-at-one fault.

Figure 21: An Example of an LUT Error
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MUX Defect: In this fault, the SEU affects the MUX select signal thereby resulting in a
different signal getting routed to the output. This is shown in Figure 22, where the output
was originally configured to pass input Y, but the upset causes X to be selected instead.

Figure 22: A MUX Defect
Initialization Defect: The configuration memory consists of bits that are associated with
the CLB initialization that are used to define the behavior of the block resources. For
instance, the storage elements can be configured as edge-triggered D-type flip-flops or as
level-sensitive latches. Another option would be to program the function generator to
behave as an LUT, RAM, or shift-register element (for more information see [31]).
Upsets in these bits can therefore severely affect the design.
4.6.2.3 IOB Faults
IOBs are used to specify the operation mode for the package pins. A simplified diagram
of a Virtex IOB is shown in Figure 23 [35]. A pin can be configured in either of three
basic signal modes – input, output or inout (bi-directional tri-stated). Other configuration
options for the IOB include selecting the I/O standard (LVCMOS, LVTTL etc.), signal
terminations (pull-up, pull-down resistors), specifying the signal drive strength and
configuring optional storage elements associated with each mode. Either of these features
is capable of being altered by an SEU.
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Figure 23: A Simplified IOB Element [35]
A particularly serious condition arises when an upset inverts the signal direction, as in an
input signal getting transformed to an output, shown in Figure 24 [35]. The activation of
the tri-state buffer controlling the output driver causes the output signal O to be routed to
the same pad as the input. The likelihood of this kind of situation to transpire however is
very rare and usually requires more than one upset. A test was conducted at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory to study this for the case of single and two-bit upsets on a
Virtex FPGA [35]. The FPGA consisted of 512 IOBs and a configuration size of
5,962,944 bits. They determined that at least two configuration upsets were required for
the IOB failure to take place. Further, with the assumption of a uniform upset
distribution, the probability of this event occurring was 2.9x10-11.

(a) IOB as an input (simplified)

(b) Altered IOB

Figure 24: An Error in an IOB Element [35]
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4.7 SEU Mitigation Techniques
Radiation-hardening against SEUs can be done in several ways. It can either be
inherently built into the device during the manufacturing phase or be realized by making
modifications to the design. The most commonly used approach incorporates redundant
components that reduce chances of interruptions in the operation due to upsets.
Correction of an upset following detection is usually desirable to prevent accumulation of
errors especially in the case of FPGAs where multiple upsets can increase the likelihood
of SEFIs. This section discusses different types of methods that are commonly employed
to cope with the SEU problem. One must be aware nonetheless that an overhead is
always involved, either in the form of cost, power consumption, or area.
4.7.1

Technology-Based Techniques

4.7.1.1 Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI)
In this method a different substrate consisting of an insulated SiO2 layer over a silicon
substrate is used in place of the conventional silicon bulk substrate. Bulk structures used
when fabricating CMOS-based devices utilize wells to provide isolation between adjacent
configurations. These however increase their vulnerability to SELs due creation of
parasitic transistors. SOIs provide complete device isolation, thereby eliminating the use
of such well structures, and hence reducing susceptibility to latch-ups. They can also
provide some resistance against SEUs by reducing the charge collection area. Another
common type of SOI is called Silicon-on-Sapphire (SOS). In this case a thin epitaxial Si
layer is grown over a sapphire substrate. Both SOI and SOS improve device resistance
against SELs and TID effects and can also reduce the number of SEU events, but the
fabrication processes are known to be costly.
4.7.1.2 Epitaxial CMOS Process
This is a widely used technique, though not as advanced as SOI. An epitaxial layer is
grown over a highly doped Si substrate. The low resistivity resulting from the highly
doped region, limits its charge-collection thereby improving its immunity against SEUs.
This arrangement offers limited SEL protection since the parasitic latch-up elements are
still present unlike in SOIs.
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4.7.2

Design-Based Techniques

4.7.2.1 Spatial Redundancy
A classic example of spatial redundancy is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). TMR is
a widespread method and is applied to several domains other than SEU mitigation. It
works on the principle of using three identical design blocks and then voting on their
results to detect failures. An output is obtained as long as at least two of the blocks are
functioning correctly. If a module encounters an error, it is detected by the voter and can
then be corrected by reconfiguring the block. The module can represent a physical
hardware resource such as a processor or a board or can be redundant logic on the same
chip. An apparent weakness of the simple approach described in Figure 25 is that an
upset in the voter or in the input cannot be countered. This can be resolved by triplicating
the voter, and supplying the input from three identical computations through different
paths.

Figure 25: TMR Block Diagram
A derivative of the TMR can be used to detect and correct SEUs for state-dependent logic
such as counters and is shown in Figure 26 [36]. This scheme uses three voters and also
protects the circuit against the accumulation of faults. Counters can be permanently
knocked out of sequence by an SEU that affects its current state. Voter circuits only
detect SEU events and fault-tolerance is provided by voting out the faulty sector.
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However in case of counters, the affected slice needs to be restored to the correct state
before an upset in another logic segment results in a faulty output. This is done in Figure
26 where a feedback path from the voter output refreshes the counter to the correct state.
The clock signal is also triplicated to further improve its robustness. An evident tradeoff
associated with TMR is the imposed area penalty (~3x).

Figure 26: Implementation of TMR for State-Dependent Logic [36]
4.7.2.2 Temporal Redundancy
A variant of TMR provides redundancy in the time domain. This technique is generally
used to offer mitigation against SETs in inputs or in combinatorial logic. It functions by
sampling the signal at different time periods as shown in Figure 27. A delay element is
added to CLKA and is used to clock elements B and C. Assuming positive edge-triggered
flip-flops, if an SET is present in the input during the rising edge of CLKA, it gets latched
in block A. However, the transient dies off before blocks B and C get affected and hence
the error can be voted out. The time delay ∆t is crucial for the proper operation of this
circuit and must be chosen based on the maximum expected width of the SET. This
scheme requires fewer elements than spatial TMR, but pays the price in terms of a lower
speed, which is at least twice the anticipated SET pulse width.
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Figure 27: An Example of Temporal Redundancy

Figure 28: A Temporal Sampling Latch [37]
A different approach called the temporal sampling latch makes use of both temporal and
spatial redundancy to provide better immunity against data SEU and SET events [37].
This design also provides protection against SETs in the clock signals. The circuit
consists of nine level sensitive latches as shown in Figure 28. Clocks B through D are
phase shifted versions of CLKA providing the time-based redundancy, while the spatial
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redundancy is provided by the three parallel paths. While an improvement from the
previous methods, it also inherits weaknesses from both.
4.7.2.3 Scrubbing
Scrubbing is a technique used primarily in SRAM-based FPGAs to prevent accumulation
of

errors.

This

method

uses

inherent

functions

of

these

devices

like

readback/reconfiguration to provide SEU mitigation. This is done in two phases –
detection and correction. Detection involves performing a readback operation that reads
back the current data present in the configuration memory. A bit-by-bit comparison is
then carried out between the readback file and the original (golden) bitstream to
determine the number and position of the upsets. The device is then ‘scrubbed’ to remove
the faults by reconfiguring the device with the golden configuration.
Several modifications to this flow can be made to speed up the process. The easiest way
is to skip the detection phase altogether and scrub the device periodically at a predefined
rate called the ‘scrub rate’. This has the added advantage of faster upset correction as well
as a reduced overhead, since the detection process requires additional memory to perform
the comparison. This method can be used if the only concern is to avoid accretion of
faults.
In Virtex devices, the configuration memory is organized in the form of one-bit vertical
frames as shown in Figure 29 [38]. These are the smallest addressable components for
read/write operations involving the configuration memory. A scheme developed at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory uses each of these frames to calculate a corresponding
16-bit CRC value [39]. These are then used during the comparison process to determine
SEU occurrences. This methodology reduces the computation and memory required with
respect to the normal scrubbing process. Many of the current FPGAs such as the Virtex II
permit partial reconfiguration/readback. This gives the designer the option to scrub only
affected frames instead of the entire device, greatly lowering the scrubbing duration.

50

Figure 29: Configuration Frames in the Virtex II [38]
The scrub rate needs to be carefully selected depending on the estimated SEU rate.
Ideally it should be high enough to correct a fault before the arrival of another upset.
Based on the system requirements however, one might be willing to tolerate a few faults
in exchange for a lower scrubbing overhead. Scrubbing is commonly used in conjunction
with the other mitigation techniques discussed earlier, like TMR, to give a higher degree
of immunity against SEUs.
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Chapter 5
Implementation of the XHWIF Interface

5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the XHWIF interface that was developed for
the Virtex II board used in this work. This interface is a key component of JBits since it
makes it possible to use this tool with virtually any board that has a supported FPGA.

5.2 JBits
JBits is a suite of Java classes that provide an API into Xilinx FPGA bitstreams. It
provides the lowest level access to the FPGA and can be used to configure CLBs as well
as routing resources [41]. The bitstream is either generated from Xilinx tools such as
Xilinx ISE or obtained directly from the device by initiating a readback. A major
advantage of JBits is that the bitstream generation or modification is extremely fast,
limited only by Java compilation times as opposed to the slow synthesis times of
traditional design tools especially for large designs.
A typical design flow followed while using JBits is shown in Figure 30 [41]. Since the
entire implementation is in Java, a simple Java-based development environment is used
instead of the traditional CAD approach. JBits communicates with the development board
through an interface known as the Xilinx HardWare InterFace (XHWIF). Since each
board has a different setup, a custom XHWIF port needs to be supplied for each one. This
is done through the Java Native Interface (JNI) in the form of a C/C++ program. The
program essentially utilizes a known standard such as SelectMAP or Boundary-Scan to
access the FPGA on the board. XHWIF provides a layer of abstraction that enables JBits
applications to run on different development boards without modifications. Once a port is
defined for a particular board, it can be used to connect to it locally or even remotely
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through a TCP/IP based network. Other tools such as BoardScope also utilize the same
XHWIF interface to connect to the hardware. BoardScope is a graphical debugging tool
that can be used to probe and analyze FPGA resources.

Jbits
Libraries

User Code
(Java)

Java Compiler

Output
Bitstream
(.bit)

XHWIF

.bit file
FPGA

Board

Figure 30: JBits Execution
JBits can be used to create new designs or modify existing ones. Both applications
require an input file (.bit) to be specified, either in the form of a null bitstream or one
synthesized from a complete design. The resources are viewed in the form of a 2dimensional array of CLBs, each of which is referenced through a row and column.
Settings for individual elements within the CLBs such as the LUTs and flip-flops along
with their respective routing can then be configured to form logic functions.
Previous versions of JBits provided support for the Xilinx XC4000 and Virtex families
while the current release, JBits3 was developed for the Virtex II. JBits was originally
conceived as a tool to support dynamic reconfiguration for run-time reconfiguration
(RTR) based systems, an option that was not supported by the normal HDL or schematic
capture based flows [41]. This has provided the means to develop powerful fault recovery
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mechanisms. Design changes can be made on-the-fly to create redundant logic or specify
alternate routing as a workaround for faulty or permanently damaged areas on the device.
The IDEA lab here at the University of Kentucky has been actively involved in the area
of dependable and fault-tolerant computing. Hence this function of JBits is particularly
appealing and needs to be further investigated in future.

5.3 Virtex-II Evaluation Board
The board used for this work is the Virtex-II Evaluation Board manufactured by Avnet.
Figure 31 shows the board and highlights the elements utilized for this work, namely
[42]:

Figure 31: The Virtex-II Evaluation Board

54

•

A Xilinx Virtex II XC2V1000-4FG256 FPGA.

•

A Xilinx XC18V04VQ44C configuration EEPROM having a capacity of 4 Mbits.

•

Two 50-pin I/O headers (92 FPGA I/O lines, 4 GND, 2 clock and 2 VCC).

•

Header for providing JTAG connectivity.

•

Eight discrete LEDs and two push-buttons for testing.

•

Status LEDs (power and ‘DONE’).

•

A push-button for initiating a configuration reset.

•

A jumper header for configuration mode selection.

•

A 40 MHz oscillator that supplies the global clock to the FPGA.

The board features several other options that were not used such as an RS-232 serial port,
DIP switches, a digital thermometer, MICTOR connectors for logic analyzer support, etc.
Three of the five configuration modes supported by the FPGA can be selected using the
jumpers on the mode select header as shown in Table 3 (M0 at leftmost position).
SelectMAP is an 8-bit wide parallel configuration mode, which although supported by
the PROM, has not been enabled on the board. The master/slave serial modes allow the
FPGA to be configured from the EEPROM, while boundary-scan can be used to program
the FPGA from an external off-board source. The boundary-scan mode was selected to
access the FPGA and will be discussed in the next section.
Table 3: Board Configuration Mode Settings
Configuration Mode

M0

M1

M2

Master Serial

Open

Open

Open

Slave Serial

Jumpered

Jumpered

Jumpered

Boundary-Scan (JTAG)

Jumpered

Open

Jumpered

Master SelectMAP

Not Supported

Slave SelectMAP

Not Supported
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The ‘DONE’ LED is used to indicate a successful device configuration. It is driven by the
DONE pin of the Virtex II, a configuration status pin that is actively pulled low while
programming and released after the device has been properly configured. The
configuration reset push-button shown in the figure is connected to the FPGA PROG_B
pin. This is an active-low pin that is used to clear the configuration memory of the device.
The board also has an additional oscillator socket in case a higher system clock speed is
required.

5.4 The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) Interface
JTAG or boundary-scan is the term typically used for the IEEE standard 1149.1. This
standard was formulated as a means for testing and debugging devices and is supported
by a large number of ICs today. In addition to using it for testing, many of the FPGAs can
also be programmed through the JTAG interface.

I/O Pins

Device
Core
Logic

Boundary-Scan
Cells

Config Register
ID Register

TDI

TDO

Bypass Register
Instruction Register
TAP
Controller

TMS
TCK
TRST (optional)

Figure 32: Boundary-Scan Architecture
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The standard defines a set of mandatory elements that need to be present for a device to
be considered JTAG compliant. These consist of the Test Access Port (TAP), the TAP
controller, the instruction register, the instruction decoder, the boundary-scan register,
and the bypass register [38]. Other than these, devices can also support optional
components to facilitate testing or provide additional services. The Virtex II for example
has an optional 32-bit identification register and a 64-bit configuration register. The
boundary-scan architecture is shown in Figure 32. The boundary-scan cells are used
during an active test operation and collectively form the boundary-scan register
The TAP connector is composed of 5 pins:
1. TCK (Test Clock) – This is the JTAG clock that sequences the TAP controller
and the registers. It is controlled by the device administering the test or
configuration. The pulse rates need not be fixed.
2. TMS (Test Mode Select) – This pin decides the state of the TAP controller and is
registered at the rising edge of TCK. It has an internal pull-up resistor incase the
pin is not driven.
3. TDI (Test Data In) – This is the serial input line for the JTAG instruction and
data registers. The register that receives the data is selected based on the state of
the TAP controller and the instruction stored in the instruction register. The pin is
sampled on the rising edge of TCK
4. TDO (Test Data Out) – This is the serial output line of the JTAG interface. It
supplies the data from the current selected register to the JTAG chain. Its value is
updated on the falling edge of TCK.
5. TRST (Test Reset) – This is an optional pin that is used to asynchronously
initialize the TAP controller. When driven low, the JTAG register is disabled and
the device is placed in a normal mode.
The Virtex II TAP incorporates the first four mandatory pins in its TAP. In addition, it
has internal pull-up resistors for TMS and TDI incase they are not actively driven.
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The TAP controller is essentially a 16-state finite state machine as shown in Figure 33.
The state of the controller is decided by the value on the TMS pin at the rising edge of
TCK (shown adjacent to each state). The state machine is divided into two sequences,
one for the Data Register (DR) and the other for the Instruction Register (IR). Once the
register is selected, TDI or TDO is used to shift-in/shift-out data from it. A list of all the
JTAG registers as well as the available instructions in the Virtex II can be found in
Appendix A. A short description of the TAP states follows:

Figure 33: TAP Controller State Diagram [38]
•

Test-Logic-Reset: This state brings the device into the normal mode by disabling
the test logic. Depending on the device, the IR is either loaded with an IDCODE
instruction or a BYPASS instruction.

•

Run-Test-Idle: As the name suggests, this state can be used to run a test, if any,
associated with the current instruction. Otherwise the test logic is in an idle state.

•

Select-DR-Scan: This functions as an intermediate state to enter the DR scan path
or proceed to the IR sequence.

•

Select-IR-Scan: This state is used to enter the IR scan path or else perform a
Test-Logic-Reset.
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•

Capture-DR: In this state, data is loaded into the selected DR from parallel
inputs on the rising edge of TCK.

•

Capture-IR: The current device status is captured into the IR in a parallel
manner. The two least significant bits should be ‘01’.

•

Shift-DR/ Shift-IR: In this state, the DR/IR is linked between TDI and TDO. The
captured value can be viewed through TDO while new data is being shifted in
from TDI. When shifting in an instruction or a data stream, the last bit needs to be
loaded while transitioning to Exit1-DR/Exit1-IR i.e. with TMS = 1.

•

Exit1-DR/ Exit1-IR: This state is encountered when exiting from a ShiftDR/Shift-IR operation.

•

Pause-DR/ Pause-IR: This state can be used to temporarily freeze a
data/instruction shift operation.

•

Exit2-DR/ Exit2-IR: This state givesthe TAP controller the option to return to
the Shift-DR/Shift-IR state.

•

Update-DR: The data in the current DR is latched on the falling edge of TCK.
This effectively updates the DR.

•

Update-IR: In this state the instruction in the IR gets latched on the falling edge
of TCK, making it the current active instruction.

5.5 XHWIF Implementation for the Virtex II Board
5.5.1

The JTAG Scan Chain

Developing an XHWIF interface for a hardware platform is based upon two key factors.
The first factor is the number and types of devices present on the board that are a part of
the JTAG chain, while the second is the communication standard used to access these
devices. When multiple JTAG-compliant devices are present on a board, they can either
each have individual JTAG ports, or they can be connected serially on the same scan
chain. The latter arrangement known as a ‘daisy-chain’ requires just one JTAG port to
access all the devices and is employed by most of the boards including the one in
question. The daisy-chain sequence herein consists of the PROM followed by the Virtex
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II as shown in Figure 34. The normal single-device configuration approach needs to be
modified in order to be applicable in this case.

Figure 34: Boundary-Scan Chain on the Virtex II Board

Figure 35: Parallel Cable III [43]
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5.5.2

Host PC-Board Communication Interface

The link between the host computer and the board is provided by means of a Xilinx
Parallel Download Cable III. The cable provides a parallel port (DB-25) connection on
the PC side and a flying-lead JTAG pinout (JTAG header) on the FPGA side. An
alternate header (FPGA header) is also provided for configuring in slave-serial mode.
The TAP pins map onto the Data and Status ports of the parallel-port interface as
indicated by the schematic of Figure 36. All the pins are mapped to true logic.

Figure 36: Parallel Cable III Schematic [43]
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5.5.3

The Java Native Methods

The XHWIF interface documents several methods that need to be supplied. These include
methods to connect/disconnect, perform configuration, readback, read/write to on-board
RAM, control the system clock etc. While the methods need to be defined for the
interface to be created, a complete implementation for all of them is not required. The
functions that are never invoked need only be implemented as dummy functions that at
most return a value. The native methods for the interface were created in C++ using the
Microsoft™ Visual Studio™ environment. The two key functions that were developed
for this port were for FPGA configuration and readback. Other than these some functions
were added to enhance functionality.
5.5.3.1 Connecting to the Board
The Connect() method functions as an initialization module before other methods are
invoked. The function creates a JTAG Port object in order to control the JTAG interface.
There is no specific instruction as such required to establish communication with the
board. This function merely verifies that the cable connecting the PC to the board is
working correctly. This is done via a ‘sanity check’, i.e. the IDs of the PROM and the
FPGA are acquired and checked against their actual values. This ensures that the devices
are working properly and there are no faults in the setup. A problem was encountered
initially while getting the device IDs and a constant value of 0x00000000 was being read
from the devices. The cause was traced to the tri-state buffer controlled by pin 6 of the
parallel port (Figure 36) that was getting enabled by default and continually driving TDO
low.
5.5.3.2 Getting the Device IDs
The device IDs reside in the 32-bit identification register and can be obtained by shifting
in an IDCODE instruction (Appendix A) into the JTAG instruction register. The
CheckIdCode() method used to execute this follows a multiple-device approach wherein
it accesses the devices one at a time simultaneously bypassing the other. Since the board
does not have provisions to bypass the devices in hardware, this needs to be done via
JTAG instructions. The target device is loaded with the required instruction while the
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other device is programmed with a BYPASS instruction. Once a device is bypassed, it
acts as a 1-bit buffer by establishing a link between its TDI and TDO pins through the
bypass register. It should be noted that the TAP state-machines for all the devices are
functionally equivalent. A flowchart depicting the sequence followed to get Device IDs is
shown in Figure 37.

Figure 37: Flowchart for Fetching Device IDs
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5.5.3.3 FPGA Configuration
The SetConfiguration() method at present only supports configuration of the FPGA. The
PROM is only used initially while accessing its Device ID and is otherwise bypassed.
Configuration as well as readback in the Virtex II is managed by configuration registers.
The registers are selected by individual packets in the device bitstream and are then used
to specify configuration settings or handle internal signals before programming the
configuration memory. Appendix B documents these registers and gives a detailed
explanation for a few of them. Some of the commonly used data packets and packet
headers are also provided.
In case of the Virtex II, a configuration can either imply a normal configuration or a
reconfiguration. From our perspective, a normal configuration involves configuring a
device from scratch, while a reconfiguration is performed on a previously configured
device without clearing its configuration memory. Reconfiguration involves some
additional steps and can be performed while the device is still operating (active
reconfiguration) or by first placing the device in a safe shutdown state (shutdown
reconfiguration). A shutdown reconfiguration was used here since the first method can
result in data contention and can potentially damage the device.
Figure 38 shows the main steps involved in configuring the Virtex II. Note that
instructions are loaded in LSB first while a bitstream shift starts with the MSB. The
startup and shutdown sequences are identical and entail placing the TAP in the RTI state
and providing a minimum of 12 clock cycles. Certain additional steps (not shown) are
also involved while performing a reconfiguration. For instance, the device will ignore
packet data until it encounters a synchronization word (0xAA995566). Also, in order to
prevent a possible contention with previous configuration data, the AGHIGH command
needs to be written to the command register (CMD) before programming the device. This
places all interconnects in a high-impedance state by asserting the GHIGH_B signal. The
current error checking routine makes use of an Instruction Capture as specified in the
Virtex II BSDL file to monitor the DONE pin. This is a simple approach that only
requires a few TDO read cycles. The pin can also be monitored by reading the device
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Status Register (see Appendix B). This method was used initially for extended
debugging.
Method
Invoked

Initialize devices to
TLR state

Is this a
reconfiguration?

Yes

Load FPGA with
JSHUTDOWN
(BYPASS PROM )

No
Load FPGA with
CFGIN and PROM
with BYPASS

Perform a Shutdown
sequence

Shift in the
bitstream MSB
first

Reset TAP by
entering TLR state

Load FPGA with
JSTART instruction
(BYPASS PROM)

Perform a Startup
sequence

No

Is DONE pin
high?

ErrorCode < 0
(ERROR)
ErrorCode = 0
(Success)

Yes

Return
ErrorCode

Figure 38: FPGA Configuration Flowchart
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5.5.3.4 Readback
In addition to allowing the configuration memory to be readback, the Virtex II also
allows the contents of the user memory elements such as the BlockRAM, LUT RAM, etc.
to be examined. While useful for debugging a design, it is fairly difficult to identify faults
in these bits since the contents constantly change based on the current state of the
registers. Hence it was decided to ignore these bits while verifying a device readback.
Similar to the reconfiguration process, the FPGA supports both active and shutdown
readback. Again the former approach can cause problems by altering the user memory
contents

and

was

therefore

not

chosen for

the

current GetConfiguration()

implementation. Figure 39 highlights the major segments of the function. The shutdown
sequence operates in an opposite manner to startup and is signaled by the DONE pin
being pulled low. In order to readback from the Virtex II, the Frame Address Register
(FAR) must be configured with the first frame that is to be read, 0x00000000 in our case
since we are performing a full readback. This needs to be followed by the amount of data
to be scanned in the form of 32-bit words. Now the XC2V1000 consists of a total of 1104
frames, with each frame containing 106 words [38]. This amounts to 117024
configuration words. However the frame buffer pipelines the read data in a manner that
the current frame is shifted out while a frame is fetched from the device memory, hence
the first frame always consists of unneeded pad data and can be discarded. For this reason
the Frame Data Output Register (FDRO) needs to be configured with a total of (1104 + 1)
frames.
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Method
Invoked

Reset TAP
(TLR state)

Load FPGA with
JSHUTDOWN
(BYPASS PROM )

Perform a Shutdown
sequence
Shift in CFGIN
(BYPASS PROM)

Write FAR with starting
frame address
(0x00000000)

Set FDRO with total
read length
(117130 words)

Load FPGA with
CFGOUT
(BYPASS PROM)
Shift out readback data
through TDO

Load FPGA with
JSTART
(BYPASS PROM )
Perform a Startup
sequence

Is DONE pin high?

No
ErrorCode < 0
(ERROR)

ErrorCode = 0
(Success)

Yes

Return
ErrorCode

Figure 39: Flowchart showing a Readback Sequence
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While performing the readback it was initially found that a status LED, used in the design
to indicate that the logic operation had been initiated, would remain OFF although the
DONE pin indicated a successful readback. Closer inspection showed that all the logic
signals appeared to be in a high-impedance state. The problem was found to be that the
GHIGH_B signal was disabling all interconnects. The LFRM command had to be used to
de-activate the signal thereby enabling interconnects. Both partial reconfiguration and
readback can be implemented with some modifications. For example, by specifying the
address of the targeted frame to the FAR and changing the number of words to be read,
only the contents of selected frames can be read back instead of the entire bitstream.
5.5.4

The XHWIF Interface

Once the native methods have been realized, they are supplied to the XHWIF JNI in the
form of a library (in our case a Dynamic Linked Library (DLL)). The test application can
then use an XHWIF object to communicate with the board. The Java test environment
including the XHWIF interface was developed using the Eclipse™ IDE. Since the source
for XHWIF was not provided in the JBits3 SDK package, a subclass was utilized to
implement additional functions.
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Chapter 6
Testing Methodology

6.1 Introduction
The test setup utilizes JBits for performing both the fault simulation as well as correction.
A simple form of fault detection would involve periodically performing a readback on the
device, and scanning the bits against the golden bitstream for possible errors. However in
cases when no faults have occurred this would waste processor computing time. A
dedicated logic block was therefore created to perform the function of uncovering errors
and provide a means of alerting the processor on detected occurrences.

6.2 SEU Detection Logic
SEU characterization in case of FPGAs can be done through two modes, static or
dynamic. Both modes are used to determine the device SEU cross-section using known
parametric models such as the Weibull fit [45]. The SEU cross-section is defined as the
number of upset events occurring per unit particle fluence and is expressed in units of
cm2/bit.
In the static mode the FPGA is not clocked and the detection scheme merely consists of
periodically reading the SRAM configuration memory for affected bits. This method
cannot detect upsets in combinatorial elements or SETs. Also, the FPGA is typically
expected to be performing some sort of function when integrated into a spacecraft
system. Thus the detection strategy developed here was based on dynamic device
operation. The approach described in [45] was used wherein identical shift register (SFR)
slices were created and their outputs were constantly compared for mismatches due to
potential SEUs. The SFRs were fed with a ‘checkerboard’ pattern (alternating ‘1’s and
‘0’s) as depicted in Figure 40. Four distinct DCMs were used to provide the clock for the
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SFR slices and their corresponding pattern generators. Upset detection can be carried out
by using a minimum of two blocks. However a higher number of logic slices virtually
factors out the possibility of upsets affecting the same stage of a redundant SFR and
thereby going undetected. Once a fault is registered by the comparator, it activates the
SEU_STATUS signal that can be used by a microcontroller to initiate a readback. After
the affected bits have been recorded, the controller can then clear the register for
detecting future upsets.

Figure 40: SEU Detection Logic
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The design was created in Verilog using Xilinx ISE. The lengths of the SFRs were kept
large in order to use a greater number of resources (CLB flip-flops in this case). This
implementation utilized 99% of the available Virtex II slices and 89% of the CLB flipflops. Alternately, resource utilization could also be increased by increasing the number
of blocks instead of the SFR length. Since the emphasis of this logic was only on SEU
detection, TMR techniques were not implemented.

Figure 41: Screenshot of the Java Test Program
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6.3 Test Procedure
A test program in Java was created specifically for testing the newly developed XHWIF
interface and for managing the faults in the bitstream. The program accepts the board
name (implemented XHWIF) and the input bitstream as arguments. An options switch is
used to instruct the program on the operation to be performed (configuration (c),
readback (r), fault injection (f) and/or verification (v)). If the design bitstream is not in
the program directory, a relative or absolute path needs to be specified.

6.3.1

Phase I: Fault-Free Operation

The aim of this section is mainly proof-of-operation. The bitstream generated for the
detection logic is used to program the FPGA, and the same file is then read back from the
device and verified. This flow is used to identify any bugs in the implemented native
methods and to make sure that they are removed before carrying out any further testing.
The content of this section will also serve as an introduction to the various aspects of the
test program and the steps involved when verifying a Virtex II bitstream.
The test application is invoked with three options (-cvr) and a relative path to the original
design file. The program starts off by scanning the JTAG compliant devices on the board
and displaying their device IDs. Although the board has 2 such devices, configuration
and readback procedures have only been supplied for the Virtex II as displayed on the
console:
Connected to:

Avnet Virtex II Eval Board

Found 2 device(s) with following DeviceID(s) in the JTAG chain
Legacy PROM XC18V04: 0x5036093 (ID)
Virtex II XCV1000: 0x31028093 (ID)
Configuration/Readback supported for FPGA Device Type - XC2V1000,
Package Type - FG256

After communication with the board has been verified, the configuration phase is started.
The application creates local copies of the necessary files from the specified design path.
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These are namely a bitstream, and a mask file ($(DesignName).msk) that is utilized
during verification. The XHWIF interface then initiates the configuration process by
making a call to the SetConfiguration() native method. The total time displayed below is
measured from the instant when the virtex2xhwif class makes the call till when it returns
from the method.
Creating a local copy of 'seu_tester.bit' and 'seu_tester.msk' in
current directory

Loading file 'seu_tester.bit'
(Re)Configuring device...
Done!!!
(Time taken 30.875 seconds)

The ReadbackCommand class of JBits can be used to automatically generate a readback
command stream for the Virtex II, noticeably simplifying the readback process. However,
using the class methods did not initiate proper readback sequences on the device. It was
therefore decided to move the entire implementation to the corresponding native method.
The bits that are read back are stored in a file in the work directory. As mentioned earlier,
frame one is removed since it contains pad data.
Initializing Readback...
Readback successful!!!
(Total time 27.479 seconds)
Read a total of 117024 word(s) (Frame 1 scrapped)
Readback data was written to file 'seu_tester.rb'

Once a readback bitstream is available, verifying it against the original .bit file involves
some additional steps. Not all bits in the readback data stream correspond to the actual
configuration memory. The locations of interest are identified by the mask file. This file
is structurally similar to the original bitstream except that the programming bits are
replaced with mask data. If the mask bit is a ‘0’, the corresponding bit in the .bit file
needs to be compared, otherwise if it is a ‘1’ the bit can be ignored since it relates to user
memory or a null memory location. Now the configuration bitstream consists of a file
header that stores the design name, device type etc. followed by a list of configuration
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commands. The actual frame-programming bits are placed after these two blocks as
shown in Figure 42 [38]. These blocks are absent in the readback stream and it only
contains an extra pad frame at the beginning. Thus a prerequisite for the comparison
process would be to align the actual frame data of all the three files shown in the diagram.
Since the pad frame has already been removed from the readback bitstream, and since the
mask file has a similar format as the .bit file, we only need to find the frame data offset in
the original bitstream. This is done by scanning the commands block for the FDRI write
command (see Appendix B) that marks the beginning of a frame data write process. The
32-bit word that follows the command is the total write length in words i.e. 117,130
(0x1C98A). The comparison process begins right after this word and ends when the last
bit in the readback stream is reached. Notice that faults in user memory elements have
been ignored. It is quite possible though that the detection logic on the FPGA might
capture some of these faults. This can be useful in tagging such events when the
verification stage fails in detecting any faults and further testing will be needed in this
direction.

Figure 42: Files used for Bitstream Verification [38]
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If a fault is detected the bit is recorded in an error file. More particulars on the file will be
given in the next section. The verification process is much faster since the speed is not
limited by the parallel port.
Verifying Readback...
Verified!!!
(Time taken 0.301 seconds)

Disconnected from:

6.3.2

Avnet Virtex II Eval Board.

Phase II: Fault Injection

The fault injection process is inherently an RTR with a faulty bitstream. The FPGA is
first loaded with the golden bitstream and the faults are then introduced by modifying
individual design related configuration bits. The focus of the current test logic was in
detecting SEUs in the CLB flip-flops and therefore the approach would be to target those
bits that are specifically associated with these elements. JBits is particularly useful here
since it can be used to handle each of the configurable attributes of the CLBs.
To better understand this section, a more detailed diagram of a Virtex II CLB slice is
shown in Figure 43 [31]. Either one of the several resources/attributes influencing the
operation of slice flip-flops can be altered. For demonstrating the fault injection process,
a resource that has been used in the implemented design is first selected. Consider for
example the DYMUX element that controls the input to the Y flip-flop. For slice 3 of the
CLB element lying at row 23, column 6, this resource is found to be configured to route
DY to the D input of the flip-flop. The following method is used to modify this so that
BY gets passed instead:

jbits.setCLBBits(23,6,DYMUX.CONFIG[3],DYMUX.BYINV);

Once the alteration has been done, JBits is then used to generate a faulty bitstream for
reconfiguring the device. The active-high SEU_STATUS signal then indicates whether the
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fault has been captured by the detection logic. For testing, this signal was monitored by
routing it to a status LED.

Figure 43: A Detailed Look at the CLB Slice (Top Half) [31]
In order to determine if the incorrect bit is properly identified a readback/verification
process is started next. Errors that are detected are logged by the program in an error file
($(DesignName).err).
Verifying Readback...
Found a total of 1 error(s)
(Total time 0.32 seconds)
Error bit offsets were recorded in file 'seu_tester.err'
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The file mainly logs the total errors and their bit offsets with respect to the start of the
readback file. A few additional details such as the design name, device type, etc. are also
provided in a header for future reference. The offsets are stored as 32-bit words as shown
in Figure 44, where the final word block shows the offset of the detected error bit in
hexadecimal. Assuming bit 1 at MSB, this can be interpreted as bit 5 of the byte at offset
0x00010CFD in the readback stream. Now the frame data offset calculated for the current
design bitstream was 0x9D (in bytes). Hence this translates to byte-offset 0x00010D9A
in the configuration bitstream. This is found to be consistent when matched with the
altered configuration bitstream. Bit offsets were mainly logged to aid in testing and can
be omitted in the final implementation to reduce memory consumption.

Figure 44: Error File Structure
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Table 4: Fault-Injection Test Results
Original
Value

Modified
Value

Detected
by Logic

Detected by
Readback
Verification

Effect on
Design

Error
Persists

DXMUX

BXINV

DX

Yes

Yes

(i)

Yes

DYMUX

DY

BYINV

Yes

Yes

(i)

Yes

BXINV

BX

BX_B

Yes

Yes

(iii)

No

BYINV

BY

BY_B

Yes

Yes

(ii)

Yes

CLK

CLK_B

Yes

Yes

(iii)

No

CEINV

CE

CE _B

Yes

Yes

(i)

Yes

SRINV

SR

SR_B

Yes

Yes

(i)

Yes

SRFFMUX*

ON

OFF

No

No

-

-

REVUSED

ON

OFF

Yes**

Yes

(iv)

No

ASYNC

SYNC

Yes**

Yes

(iv)

No

FFX

FF

LATCH

Yes

Yes

(iii)

No

FFY

FF

LATCH

Yes

Yes

(iv)

No

FFX_SR_ATTR

SRLOW

SRHIGH

Yes

Yes

(iv)

No

FFY_SR_ATTR

SRLOW

SRHIGH

Yes

Yes

(iv)

No

FFX_INIT_ATTR***

INIT0

INIT1

Yes

No

(iv)

No

FFY_INIT_ATTR***

INIT0

INIT1

Yes

No

(iv)

No

Attribute

CLKINV

SYNC_ATTR

* JBits did not modify any part of the bitstream when this attribute was changed.
** Depending on current state of flip-flop and position of the set (reset) pulse
*** This attribute resides in user memory of the FPGA bitstream
Notes:
(i) Containing SFR output stuck-at-0
(ii) Containing SFR output stuck-at-1
(iii) Corresponding signal out of phase
(iv) None (error effect most likely transient)
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6.4 Results
The fault-injection process was followed for several other attributes that were expected to
directly influence the flip-flop behavior. A more exhaustive approach might be
conformed to in future where other elements are also considered, such as an LUT
indirectly driving an input. Each of the test elements documented in Table 4 was carried
out for five randomly selected CLB flip-flops for consistency. The attribute names were
kept the same as their corresponding names in the Xilinx FPGA Editor for easier
identification, while the values are from the corresponding JBits classes. Only resource
based faults were tested in the present setup. However a similar approach can be followed
for observing the effects of bit modifications in the resource routing. All the faults in the
table were rectifiable through a reconfiguration with the ‘golden’ bitstream.
Each of the attributes corresponds to a specific CLB resource/configuration setting. For
instance, BYINV is identified as the MUX that immediately follows the BY input seen in
Figure 43. When set as BY, the true logic of the signal is passed while BY_B passes its
inverse. This signal is used to force the storage element into a state opposite to that of the
SR (set-reset) signal. In the current design, SR has been configured as the global reset
signal, hence BY functions as the global set for the CLB flip-flops. This explains the
observed effect shown in Table 4 when this resource is modified. This signal is inactive
(logic ‘0’) for all flip-flops except the one where the fault is injected. Hence, the faulty
element is always in a ‘set’ state resulting in a constant logic ‘1’ at the output of the
corresponding SFR. ‘Error Persists’ indicates whether the SEU_STATUS signal continues
to remain active after the error register has been cleared. Faults in several attributes will
remain dormant unless activated by certain signals. For example FFY_SR_ATTR decides
whether a logic ‘1’ on the SR input will reset (SRLOW) or set (SRHIGH) the flip-flop.
Detecting faults through the logic therefore requires the global-reset (set) signal to be
pulsed. More information on the CLB resources (attributes) mentioned in the result table
can be found in [31].
The ideal case of error detection by logic and by readback verification was found to be
true for most of the test elements. However one exception in particular, the SRFFMUX
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attribute, could not be tested. Using JBits methods to modify this element did not appear
to manifest itself in the generated bitstream. While this could be a possible bug in the
current JBits package, it is also possible that this element is not present or configurable
for the Virtex II device used here since, although it appears in the FPGA Editor tool, it is
not mentioned in the datasheet.
The REVUSED attribute is associated with the MUX element that routes the BY (BY_B)
signal to the REV (reverse SR) input of the slice flip-flops. In other words, it decides
whether the set input is enabled or disabled for a particular flip-flop. Therefore, to test the
consequence once this attribute has been modified for the targeted element, one needs to
pulse the global-set signal. This results in all flip-flops, except the one in question, to be
‘set’. Now, if the flip-flop is already at logic ‘1’ this will have no effect, and hence will
not be detected by the logic. Another constraint placed on the detection is the position at
which the asynchronous ‘set’ pulse occurs. Since the flip-flop is updated on a positive
clock edge, the fault might get overwritten by the logic of the previous stage before it
gets a chance to propagate to subsequent stages. Detection of faults related to the
SYNC_ATTR attribute also depends on a more or less similar set of conditions. This
attribute decides whether the reset and set inputs to the flip-flop are synchronous or
asynchronous.
The FFX_INIT_ATTR and FFY_INIT_ATTR attributes are special cases since they
correspond to user memory locations in the configuration bitstream. Thus it was not
possible to detect them through readback verification as was explained earlier. However
the fact that faults associated with them are detected by the logic proves the assumption
made previously, namely that it is possible that the detection logic might be capable of
capturing faults in user memory locations.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1 Summary
This thesis described the SEU problem mainly from the FPGA perspective. SEU effects
on COTS FPGAs need to be studied in detail if the capability of using such devices in
space is to be explored.
The JBits-based testing approach that was followed required the development of an
XHWIF interface for the FPGA board. This interface was created and tested for any
possible functional errors, and at present appears to be working correctly. However an
issue is sometimes known to arise when a configuration is immediately followed by
readback verification i.e. when the Java test program is invoked with the –cvr option. The
readback bitstream seems to miss one bit during the readback that causes it to go out of
sync when compared with the configuration bitstream. Although only a single bit is
missed, this causes several errors during the verification phase since the alignment
between the files to be compared is disturbed. Clearing the configuration memory and/or
a power-cycle seems to fix this. It is possible that a brief interval needs to pass after a
configuration before a readback command is issued to the FPGA and this needs to be
further looked into.
JBits was successfully used to simulate SEU faults in CLB flip-flops by modifying the
resource parameters and reconfiguring the device with the faulty bitstream. Since each of
the parameters mapped to single bits in the bitstream this could be assumed as actual bitflips occurring when the device is in a high-radiation setting. Most of the faults were
detected by both the redundant detection logic as well as during readback verification.
Once faults were detected, JBits was used to correct them through a full configuration
scrubbing.
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7.2 System Implementation
The proposed implementation of the final system is shown in Figure 45. Among the three
commonly used radiation detectors that were studied in this paper, the end-window GM
tube would be a suitable option. In particular, the sensor used in the MEROPE payload
would be a good choice since, being a CubeSat their design constraints would be similar
to our own. If possible it would be ideal to have an additional RADFET, as it would also
give a measure of the cumulative dose absorbed along with the particle flux. The detector
module will require additional components such as a high-voltage source, amplifier etc.
as were described previously. Also, the pulses from the sensor can either be counted by
the microcontroller by means of an interrupt, or through an additional counting device.

Figure 45: Proposed System Implementation
The purpose of using JBits in the current work was mainly as a source of simulating and
correcting faults. Although it has been ported to embedded platforms, the high memory
requirement of Java might be a limitation. Since the final implementation will only
require correcting faults in the FPGA, the program can be created in a C/C++ setting. The
code forming the XHWIF native methods can be reused for this purpose to create a
standalone C/C++ application. Apart from managing the configuration and readback on
the FPGA, the program would also be responsible for carrying out the bitstream
verification. This approach will reduce the memory consumption and increase the range
of possible microcontroller options. The MSP430 microcontroller from Texas
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Instruments™ could be used as the CPU, since prior experience with this processor has
already been acquired through the KySat1 project. The link between the Detection Unit
CPU and the Flight Computer can be provided through a serial RS485 interface.
Selection of the PROM will be simplified if the program size is limited so that it can
completely reside in the microcontroller memory. In this case the PROM will only be
required to hold data pertaining to the FPGA and the same PROM that was provided in
the Avnet board (XC18V04) can be used. A rad-hardened version, the XQR18V04 is also
available, and it would be advisable to use this in order to prevent possible SEU
occurrences. Depending on the process employed for readback verification at least two
such devices would be required, since the mask file also needs to be stored. Another
option would be to use the XQR17V16 that has a higher storage capacity. The processor
can communicate with the PROM via the Master Serial mode.

7.3 Future Directions
The testing in this thesis was carried out using software simulated faults. However, the
device that is selected for the final payload implementation may need to be tested in an
actual particle accelerator facility before it can be deemed suitable for orbit. Apart from
testing its susceptibility to SEUs, analysis also needs to be carried out for latch-ups and
SEFIs. Another parameter that needs to be considered is the device TID tolerance, since
their effects can severely compromise the device lifespan. Several experiments have
already been carried out on the Virtex II. For instance, an analysis of the SEU
susceptibility of the FPGA was carried out at the Texas A&M Cyclotron Facility [56].
The setup tested static configuration upsets through heavy-ion irradiations on a
XC2V1000 device, the same one used in this work. The study found that for the elements
probed, the saturation cross-section was approx. 5x10-8 cm2/bit, with upset rates of
4.4x10-7/bit-day for the configuration memory and 1.1x10-6/bit-day for the block
SelectRAM. Tests such as these can be used as references when devising the test setup in
our case.

83

The elements in the current design including the comparator logic were all operated at the
oscillator frequency (40 MHz). An alternate option might be to run the SFRs and pattern
generators at lower frequencies while keeping the speed of the detection logic high. This
configuration was not used since no changes were perceived to the detection through
logic or readback verification results in Table 4. Also, several tests had already been
carried out and it was desired to keep the results consistent. This might be employed in a
future configuration and a possible change could be on its observed effect on the design
and/or in making some of the errors in the table persistent.
At present, the parallel port limits TCK to 260 KHz. However, JTAG permits a
maximum TCK frequency of 33 MHz [31], and hence the configuration and readback
process times can be considerably reduced. Another option is to use partial
reconfiguration and/or readback. This was not used in the current implementation since it
required additional design flows to be followed. However, using it can further reduce the
process completion times to the fraction taken to access only selected frames instead of
the entire bitstream. The test environment created here demonstrated fault injection and
correction in CLB flip-flops. A similar approach can be used to probe other resources
such as the LUTs or block SelectRAM structures, in which case a design that maximizes
the utilization of that particular resource will need to be developed.

84

Appendix A
Virtex II JTAG Registers and Supported Instructions

Virtex II JTAG Instructions
The instructions that are provided in the Virtex II are given in Table 5. The size of the
instruction register (IR) also allows support for the relatively new IEEE 1532 standard for
In-System Configuration (ISC) that is based on JTAG.
Table 5: Virtex II JTAG Instructions
Instruction

Instruction
Binary Code
(5:0)

Description

JSTART

001100

Used to initialize the device startup sequence.

JSHUTDOWN

001101

Initiates the shutdown sequence in the Virtex II

CFG_IN

000101

Provides access to the configuration register for writing
(configuration).

CFG_OUT

000100

Provides access to the configuration register for reading
(readback).

BYPASS

111111

Used to bypass the device by enabling the bypass register

IDCODE

001001

Allows the device ID to be shifted out through TDO

USERCODE

001000

Allows the user specified code to be shifted out through
TDO

JPROG_B

001011

Used to clear the device configuration memory (same
function as PROG_B)

INTEST

000111

Enables the boundary-scan INTEST operation.

EXTEST

000000

Enables the boundary-scan EXTEST operation.

SAMPLE

000001

Enables boundary-scan SAMPLE operation

HIGHZ

001010

3-states the output pins while enabling the bypass register

USER1

000010

Provides access to the USER1 register
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USER2

000011

RESERVED

Provides access to the USER2 register

All other codes

Reserved instructions for Xilinx

Virtex II JTAG Register Set
The Virtex II features all the mandatory registers required by the IEEE 1149.1 BoundaryScan standard as well as some additional ones as given in [38]. These will be listed here
for reference along with a brief explanation.
Table 6: JTAG Registers for the Virtex II
Register
Length
(bit(s))

Register
Instruction Register

6

Bypass Register

1

Identification Register

32

Configuration Register

64

Boundary-Scan Register
USERCODE Register

•

3 per I/O
32

Instruction Register: This register contains the current instruction opcode. It also
captures the current device status during the Capture-IR state as given in the device
Boundary Scan Description Language (BSDL) file. The significance of the bits is
given below:
XXXX01
Bit 5

: ‘1’ when DONE pin is released (part of startup sequence)

Bit 4

: ‘1’ if house-cleaning is complete

Bits 3, 2 : Used for ISC
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•

Bypass Register: It is enabled after a BYPASS instruction. It acts as a buffer while
shifting out TDI signals to TDO. The register is reset to zero during the Capture-IR
state.

•

Identification Register: This register is used to store the device ID as defined by the
JTAG standard. The format for the Virtex II is given as (31:0):
vvvv:fffffff:aaaaaaaaa:ccccccccccc1
Where,
v is the revision code
f is the 7-bit family code = 0001000 (0x08) for the Virtex II
a is the number of array rows in the part expressed in 9 bits
for the XC2V1000 this is equal to 40 rows (0x028)
c is the company code = 00001001001 = 0x049
The IDCODE for the XC2V1000 can therefore be formed as follows:
vvvv: ffff fff:a aaaa aaaa: cccc cccc ccc1
vvvv: 0001 000:0 0010 1000: 0000 1001 0011
<v>:

•

1

0

2

8

0

9

3

(0xb)
(0xh)

Configuration Register: This JTAG register enables access to the configuration bus
after a CFG_IN or CFG_OUT instruction.

•

Boundary-Scan Register: It is essentially utilized for testing in combination with
instructions such as INTEST and EXTEST.

•

USERCODE Register: It is used to hold a user-defined code that can be something
meaningful such as the current version of the design, date when configured etc. The
code is written to the bitstream when it is generated and becomes valid after
configuration.
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Appendix B
Virtex II Selected Configuration Specifics

XC2V1000 Device Information
•

Frame Count: 1104

•

Frame Length in 32-Bit Words: 106

•

Total Configuration Bits: 3,744,768

•

Default Bitstream Size: 4,082,592 (Configuration Bits + Overhead)

•

CLB Arrangement:
o Total Slices: 5,120
o Array (row x col): 40 x 32

Packet Formats
The Virtex II has two packet types for managing the configuration process through
configuration registers. If the register access necessitates a large word count, a Type 1
header can be followed by a Type 2.

Figure 46: Packet Header Types
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Configuration Registers
The configuration registers included in the Virtex II are given below. Descriptions are
expanded for selected registers (refer to [38] for a comprehensive explanation)

Table 7: Virtex II Configuration Register Set
Register

•

Read

Write

Description

FAR

Y

Y

Frame Address Register

FDRI

N

Y

Frame Data Input Register (for configuration)

FDRO

Y

N

Frame Data Output Register (for readback)

FLR

Y

Y

Frame Length Register

CRC

Y

Y

Cyclic Redundancy Check Register

CMD

Y

Y

Command Register

STAT

Y

N

Status Register

COR

Y

Y

Configuration Option Register

CTL

Y

Y

Control Register

MASK

Y

Y

Masking Register for CTL

IDCODE

Y

Y

Device ID Code Register

LOUT

N

Y

Legacy Output Register (daisy-chain DOUT)

MFWR

N

Y

Multiple Frame Write Register

KEY

N

Y

Initial Key Address Register

CBC

N

Y

Cipher Block Chaining Register

FAR: The configuration frame is selected based on the address stored in this register.
FDRI and FDRO processes require the starting frame address to be set in order to
access the specific frames. The value in FAR auto-increments when total words as
specified by FLR have been written/read out. The current command in the CMD
register is executed each time FAR is written with a new value.
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•

FDRI: Frame data written to this register is used to configure the FPGA frame as
specified by FAR. The frame data is pipelined through the frame buffer in a manner
such that the first frame is shifted into the configuration memory while the second
frame is being shifted into the frame buffer. Hence, in order to load the last frame, an
extra pad frame needs to be written to FDRI at the end. The word following an FDRI
write is interpreted by the FPGA as an AutoCRC.

•

FDRO: This register is used to read the contents of the configuration memory. The
number of frames to be read needs to be specified in the packet header. This process
is also pipelined, wherein the first frame is shifted out of the buffer while the second
one is being read from the configuration memory. As a result the actual data begins
from the second frame, while the first frame consists of unneeded pad data. This
process does not produce a CRC value or utilize AutoCRC.

•

FLR: The frame length needs to be specified through a write to this register before an
FDRI or FDRO process can start. The value written to the FLR should be in the form
of (Actual Frame Length - 1) words e.g. for the XC2V1000, the value is 0x00000069
words.

•

CRC: 16-bit CRCs are used to check for possible errors in data writes. A data write
to any register (except LOUT) initiates a CRC calculation based on the data and
address bits of the register. A write operation to the CRC register causes a
comparison between the register value and the calculated value. If discrepancies are
detected, an ERROR state is entered by enabling the CRC_ERROR bit in the STAT
register and by holding the INIT_B pin low. CRCs can be carried out by writing a precalculated value to the CRC register using a bitstream command or by using
‘AutoCRC’, wherein the last word packet write to the FDRI is automatically read as a
CRC value.

•

CMD: This register is used to manage the configuration process through specific
command codes. The command is activated as soon it is written to this register.
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Table 8: CMD Register Codes
Command

Code

Description

WCFG

0001

Write Configuration Data. Required before an
FDRI write operation

RCFG

0100

Read Configuration Data. Required before an
FDRO read operation

RCRC

0111

Reset CRC (register).

AGHIGH

1000

Assert GHIGH_B. Used during shutdown
reconfiguration and readback to place all
interconnect in a high-impedance state to prevent
data contention.

LFRM

0011

Last Frame. Used to enable interconnects by
disabling the GHIGH_B signal

START

0101

Begin Startup Sequence. Startup sequence begins
after a successful CRC check and a DESYNCH
command

SHUTDOWN

1011

Begin Shutdown Sequence. Shutdown sequence
begins after a successful CRC check or an RCRC
command

GRESTORE

1010

Pulse GRESTORE signal. Used to set/reset (based
on user configuration) the CLB and IOB flip-flops

GCAPTURE

1100

Pulse GCAPTURE signal. Used to load the
capture cells with current register states

RCAP

0110

Reset Capture. Resets CAPTURE signal after a
readback-capture in single-shot mode

MFWR

0010

Multiple Frame Write Register. Used to write a
single frame to multiple frame addresses.

SWITCH

1001

Switch CCLK Frequency. Updates the frequency
of the Master CCLK to the value specified by the
OSCFSEL bits in the COR

1101

Reset DALIGN Signal. Used at end of
configuration to de-synchronize the device
following which, values on configuration data pins
are ignored.

DESYNCH
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•

STAT: This register can be read using JTAG or SelectMAP and is used to check the
status of several global signals.

Figure 47: The STAT Register
Table 9: Description of STAT Register Bits
Bit

Name

Description
CRC status

0

CRC_ERROR

0: No CRC error
1: CRC error
Triple-DES decryptor status

1

PART_SECURED

0: Decryptor security not set
1: Decryptor security set
Logical AND function of all DCM locked signals. Unused signals are
‘1’

2

DCM_LOCK

0: DCMs not locked
1: DCMs locked

3

DCI_MATCH

Logical AND function of all MATCH signals. Each I/O bank has one
MATCH signal. If all DCI I/Os un-instantiated in a give bank its
MATCH signal is ‘1’
0: DCI not matched
1: DCI matched

4

IN_ERROR

Indicates input data being clocked in too fast, e.g. when CCLK
frequency exceeds FCC_SELECTMAP in SelectMAP mode
0: No legacy input error
1: Legacy input error
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GTS_CFG_B signal status
5

GTS_CFG_B

0: All I/Os in high-Z state
1: I/Os not placed in high-Z state by this signal
Global Write Enable signal status

6

GWE

0: All FFs and BRAMs are write disabled
1: All FFs and BRAMs are write enabled
GHIGH_B signal status

7

GHIGH_B

0: GHIGH_B is enabled
1: GHIGH_B is disabled

10:8

MODE

MODE pins (M2:M0) status
Reflects actual level on INIT pin

11

INIT

0: INIT pin at logic ‘0’
1: INIT pin at logic ‘1’
Reflects actual level on DONE pin. If pin is released by the device
but held low externally this is displayed as low

12

DONE

0: DONE pin at logic ‘0’
1: DONE pin at logic ‘1’
Attempted to write to FDRI without successful IDCODE check

13

ID_ERROR

0: No ID_ERROR
1: ID_ERROR. (Assert PROG to rectify)
Write to FDRI issued before or after decrypt instruction

14

DEC_ERROR

0: No DEC_ERROR
1: DEC_ERROR. (Assert PROG to rectify)
Indicates if encryption keys sent in wrong order

15

BAD_KEY_SEQ

0: No decryptor key sequence error
1: Decryptor keys not used in proper sequence
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Glossary

Glossary of significant acronyms used in this thesis.

API
BSDL
CLB
CMD
CME
CMOS
COTS
CPU
CRC
DCM
DIP
DLL
DR
EEPROM
FAR
FDRI
FDRO
FET
FF
FPGA
GCR
GM
HDL
ID
IDE
IOB
IR
JNI
JTAG
JVM
KySat
LEO
LET
LFRM
LSB
LUT
MOSFET
MSB

Application Programming Interface
Boundary Scan Description Language
Configurable Logic Block
Command Register
Coronal Mass Ejection
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
Central Processing Unit
Cyclic Redundancy Check
Digital Clock Manager
Dual In-Line Package
Dynamic Linked Library
Data Register
Electrically Erasable PROM
Frame Address Register
Frame Data Input Register
Frame Data Output Register
Field Effect Transistor
Flip-Flop
Field Programmable Gate Array
Galactic Cosmic Ray
Geiger-Müller
Hardware Description Language
Identification
Integrated Development Environment
Input Output Block
Instruction Register
Java Native Interface
Joint Test Action Group
Java Virtual Machine
Kentucky Satellite
Low Earth Orbit
Linear Energy Transfer
Last Frame
Least Significant Bit
Look-Up-Table
Metal Oxide Semiconductor FET
Most Significant Bit
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MUX
NASA
PIP
PROM
RADFET
RAM
ROM
RTI
RTR
SEB
SEE
SEFI
SEGR
SEL
SET
SEU
SFR
SHE
SOI
SOS
SR
SRAM
TAP
TCK
TDI
TDO
TID
TLR
TMR
TMS
UHF
VHF
XHWIF

Multiplexer
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Programmable Interconnect Point
Programmable ROM
Radiation Sensitive FET
Random Access Memory
Read Only Memory
Run-Test-Idle
Run-Time Reconfiguration
Single Event Burnout
Single Event Effect
Single Event Functional Interrupt
Single Event Gate Rupture
Single Event Latch-Up
Single Event Transient
Single Event Upset
Shift Register
Single Event Hard Error
Silicon-On-Insulator
Silicon-On-Sapphire
Set-Reset
Static RAM
Test Access Port
Test Clock
Test Data In
Test Data Out
Total Ionizing Dose
Test-Logic-Reset
Triple Modular Redundancy
Test Mode Select
Ultra High Frequency
Very High Frequency
Xilinx Hardware Interface
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